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Article 3

LIMITED CHOICES: HOW THE SCHOOL-CHOICE PARADIGM
SUBVERTS EQUAL EDUCATION FOR STUDENTS
WITH DISABILITIES
AMANDA S. SEN ∗
ABSTRACT
While there is no absolute right to education in the Constitution
of the United States, legislation and litigation have created and
elucidated specific rights of children to, at a minimum, equal opportunity in education. For students with disabilities, the right to
equality in educational opportunity can be found in both federal
statutes and under the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution.
Rapidly developing education policy currently promotes increasing options for parents to use federal and state funds to send their
children to schools other than their neighborhood public schools
(“school choice”). However, the specific rights of students with
disabilities have been largely overlooked. This Article will explain
the ways in which school-choice laws and the rights of students
with disabilities overlap and interact, expose gaps that leave students with disabilities vulnerable, and suggest actions that legislators and litigators can take to mitigate that vulnerability and ensure equal opportunity in education.
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INTRODUCTION
There is a private school in East Harlem, New York City that charges
no tuition. Admission to students in pre-kindergarten through eighth grade
is ostensibly by lottery; though, as with most school lotteries, priorities like
sibling attendance are in place. The mission of this school, Storefront Academy, is:
[T]o provide children of varied academic strengths quality educational opportunities, preparing them academically, socially and
emotionally to become critical thinkers, high-achieving students
and well-rounded individuals. Working in partnership with fami-

472

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 78:470

lies and community members, Storefront Academy instills a powerful sense of self, and gives its students the tools to own the future
and create meaningful adult lives. 1
Storefront Academy serves students of varied academic strengths, from
students with learning disabilities to very gifted students, and its students appear to succeed. Though an overwhelming majority of students come from
economically disadvantaged backgrounds, ninety-five percent of graduating
eighth graders go on to graduate from high school in a city in which about
seventy percent of students graduate from high school. 2 The school itself has
grown and expanded into a second site, this one funded as a charter school. 3
Broadly, “school choice” refers to any scenario in which a parent can
select a school for their child rather than simply being assigned to a public
school, and Storefront Academy is a school choice success story. Indeed, the
current principal of Storefront Academy Harlem states in her biography that
she is “a proud supporter of school choice and education reform.” 4
But, while Storefront Academy serves many students well, it is also emblematic of the limitations of school choice. The school has small classes
and dedicated teaching assistants in each elementary school classroom, bringing the student-to-teacher ratios for both general education and special education students down to incomparable lows. 5 Those low student-to-teacher
ratios—undoubtedly a key factor in the school’s success—are funded with
private money and are simply not replicable under most public-school funding constraints. 6 And yet, even with unusually low student-to-teacher ratios,
Storefront Academy does not typically serve students who have needs greater
than mild learning disabilities or mild speech and language disorders. Only
twelve percent of the student body has an Individualized Education Program
1. About Us, STOREFRONT ACAD., http://storefrontacademy.org/about-us (last visited Feb.
18, 2018) (emphasis added).
2. Results, STOREFRONT ACAD., http://storefrontacademy.org/results (last visited Feb. 18,
2018); Elizabeth A. Harris, Graduation Rate Made Little Progress, State Says, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 7,
2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/07/nyregion/graduation-rate-new-york.html.
3. History, STOREFRONT ACAD., http://storefrontacademy.org/history (last visited Feb. 18,
2018). The first Storefront school was founded as a non-profit and continues to be funded primarily
by private grants, but also by federal and local government programs specifically designated for
education, such as school lunch and pre-kindergarten. See FAQs, STOREFRONT ACAD., http://storefrontacademy.org/faqs (last visited Nov. 16, 2018); see also Partners & Supporters, STOREFRONT
ACAD., http://storefrontacademy.org/partners-supporters (last visited Nov. 16, 2018).
4. Leadership, STOREFRONT ACAD., http://storefrontacademy.org/leadership (last visited
Feb. 18, 2018).
5. Our Model, STOREFRONT ACAD., http://storefrontacademy.org/our-model (last visited Jan.
1, 2019). In a New York City public school, the class size for elementary school classes can be,
and often is, thirty-two students with one teacher. What Are the Class Size Limits for My Grade?,
UNITED FED’N OF TEACHERS, http://www.uft.org/faqs/what-are-class-size-limits-my-grade (last
visited Mar. 2, 2019). At the Storefront, classes in the lower school were capped at twenty and had
both a lead teacher and an assistant teacher. Our Model, supra.
6. See supra note 3.
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(“IEP”) 7 as compared to seventeen percent of New York City public-school
students. 8 The school “counsels out” students with intellectual disabilities
and emotional or behavioral disorders, telling parents their child’s needs cannot be met at the school and they should seek a different educational environment. 9
Are there parents who are thrilled that their child lucked into a seat at
the Storefront Academy? Absolutely. For those parents, this is school choice
at its finest. But a parent whose first grader has been asked to leave the school
because his sensory needs require interventions that the school will not pay
for does not have this kind of school choice. On a small scale, when there
are viable public-education options available, this might seem like a small
price to pay to optimize the educational options of other students, many of
whom also face disadvantages such as poverty. But on a larger scale, as
school-choice programs gain increasing traction and have begun to dominate
entire school districts, including New Orleans and Washington, D.C., there
is a need to protect the educational rights of the most vulnerable students.
This is particularly true as funders and advocates push for increasingly broad
school-choice policies, causing supporters of public schools to fear that funding and regulatory protections for public schools will disappear in some cities
and states. 10
Advocates for school choice, including parents, scholars, and politicians, come from many backgrounds. Some, like those who pushed for
vouchers—public funding for the tuition for individual children to attend private schools instead of local public schools—in Milwaukee, put in place in
1990, are low-income, predominately black parents frustrated with the suboptimal education available to their children in public schools. 11 Scholars
and educators who are proponents of school choice see school choice as an

7. Results, supra note 2.
8. ROBIN LAKE ET AL., CTR. ON REINVENTING PUB. EDUC., NEW YORK STATE SPECIAL
EDUCATION ENROLLMENT ANALYSIS 8 (2012), https://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED537477.pdf.
9. As a “learning specialist” at Storefront Academy (then The Children’s Storefront) from
2006 to 2009, I worked with parents, teachers, and administrators to make educational decisions.
In addition, I participated in meetings regarding students whom administrators and teachers sincerely believed the school did not have the capacity to appropriately educate, particularly students
with intellectual disabilities. Many more students never even had the opportunity to apply. As the
current principal said about her view of the Storefront before joining it, “It was almost like a hidden
secret. No one kind of knew how you get in, what happens there, but there was this expectation that
the kids did great things when they left.” Dartunorro Clark, There’s a ‘Secret Sauce’ to Learning
at Harlem’s Storefront Academy, DNAINFO (Apr. 2, 2017), https://www.dnainfo.com/newyork/20170402/east-harlem/alexis-thomas-storefront-academy.
10. See, e.g., Steven Greenhouse, Billionaires v Teachers: The Koch Brothers’ Plan to Starve
https://www.theguardian.com/usPublic Education,
GUARDIAN (Sept. 7, 2018),
news/2018/sep/07/arizona-fight-koch-brothers-school-vouchers.
11. E.g., DANIEL MCGROARTY, TRINNIETTA GETS A CHANCE: SIX FAMILIES AND THEIR
SCHOOL CHOICE EXPERIENCE 7–8 (2001).
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opportunity to expand educational options and encourage innovations. 12 Another set of advocates of school choice, including the current Secretary of
Education, Betsy DeVos, have philosophical and economic objections to the
dominance of public education in the United States and may even seek to see
public education replaced altogether. 13
Critics of school choice contend that school choice policies take resources from public schools and distract policy makers from more effective
solutions, such as addressing the underlying poverty facing students in many
struggling public schools. 14 Critics also point to the white supremacist history of school choice as a tool to avoid court-ordered integration of public
schools, 15 evidence that school-choice policies intensify racial segregation, 16

12. E.g., DAVID OSBORNE, REINVENTING AMERICA’S SCHOOLS 35–43, 84–88 (2017).
13. E.g., NANCY MACLEAN, DEMOCRACY IN CHAINS 45–74, 207–34 (2017) (describing individuals and funds seeking to undermine public school systems in the United States); Kristina Rizga,
Betsy DeVos Wants to Use America’s Schools to Build “God’s Kingdom,” MOTHER JONES, Mar.–
Apr. 2017, http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2017/01/betsy-devos-christian-schools-voucherscharter-education-secretary/.
14. E.g., DIANE RAVITCH, REIGN OF ERROR 4–6 (2013); MERCEDES K. SCHNEIDER, SCHOOL
CHOICE: THE END OF PUBLIC EDUCATION? 79–84 (2016).
15. See, e.g., Molly Townes O’Brien, Private School Tuition Vouchers and the Realities of
Racial Politics, 64 TENN. L. REV. 359, 362–63 (1997) (arguing that “[v]oucher proponents generally rely on a propagandized history of tuition vouchers that distorts the role of racial oppression in
school privatization” and “the private school tuition voucher movement, in the context of its history
and assumptions, demonstrably coincides with the white conservative pursuit of dominance and
privilege”).
16. See, e.g., ERICA FRANKENBERG ET AL., CIVIL RIGHTS PROJECT, CHOICE WITHOUT
EQUITY: CHARTER SCHOOL SEGREGATION AND THE NEED FOR CIVIL RIGHTS STANDARDS 9–11
(2010), https://escholarship.org/uc/item/4r07q8kg (“[C]harters exacerbate already rampant American school segregation, particularly for black students.”); Osamudia R. James, Opt-Out Education:
School Choice as Racial Subordination, 99 IOWA L. REV. 1083, 1114–17 (2014); Martha Minow,
Confronting the Seduction of Choice: Law, Education, and American Pluralism, 120 YALE L.J. 814,
836–40 (2011). Parents of all races prefer schools in which their children would not be a minority.
Justine S. Hastings et al., Parental Preferences and School Competition: Evidence from a Public
School Choice Program 28 (Yale Econ. Applications & Policy, Discussion Paper No. 10, 2005),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=885537 (“[T]he average preferred school for each racial group was one in
which [seventy percent] of the school was their own race.”). White parents, in particular, are reluctant to send their children to schools with large numbers of black children and use race as a proxy
for determining quality. Susan L. DeJarnatt, School Choice and the (Ir)rational Parent, 15 GEO. J.
ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 1, 18 (2008) (footnotes omitted) (“[P]arents used the internet resource to
reject schools having a significant majority of black students before they focused on other indicators
of school quality . . . [and] race is closely related to parental perceptions of school quality. . . . [A]n
increase of more than two percent in the African-American population of a student body correlated
with a perception that the school’s quality had declined even when the objective criteria contradicted
that perception.”). In North Carolina, charter schools are increasingly white as compared to district
schools. Derek W. Black, Preferencing Educational Choice: The Constitutional Limits, 103
CORNELL L. REV. 1359, 1401 (2018).
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and the problematic ways that school-choice programs, which tend to be located in low-income urban areas, generate private income for individuals and
private corporations. 17
School choice can be beneficial to many individual children. Parents
are generally happy with “choice schools,” charter schools and private
schools funded by state vouchers that parents select themselves but that are
paid for with state funds. 18 When faced with difficult problems in public
education, many educators and parents turn to school choice as a solution for
the children in front of them. Most people placing their children in choice
schools, running choice schools, or teaching within them can generally be
said to be acting in reasonable, rational, and sympathetic ways. 19
That being said, public education guarantees much more than the ability
of each parent to select the appropriate education for his or her individual
child. 20 The United States Constitution and many state constitutions require
equitable public education, 21 something school choice undermines by promoting increasingly separate and unequal educational spaces. Scholarship
on school choice has identified ways in which school-choice policies create
17. See, e.g., SAMUEL E. ABRAMS, EDUCATION AND THE COMMERCIAL MINDSET 9–11, 192–
95 (2016) (detailing the history of for-profit educational management organizations); RAVITCH, supra note 14, at 167–73 (describing ways that even non-profit charters schools generate income for
for-profit companies); NOLIWE ROOKS, CUTTING SCHOOL: PRIVATIZATION, SEGREGATION, AND
THE END OF PUBLIC EDUCATION 163–83 (2017) (describing ways in which charter and other participants in school choice profit legally and illegally from school choice in urban areas, negatively
impacting those communities).
18. See, e.g., JAY P. GREENE & GREG FORSTER, VOUCHERS FOR SPECIAL EDUCATION
STUDENTS: AN EVALUATION OF FLORIDA’S MCKAY SCHOLARSHIP PROGRAM 1, 15 (2003),
https://www.manhattan-institute.org/pdf/cr_38.pdf (describing satisfaction of parents who participate in the McKay Scholarship program as high, though only sixty-two percent of former participants were happy with their choice school). I use “choice schools” to describe charter schools and
private schools to which parents affirmatively choose to enroll their children and that receive public
funding of one type or another. Parents are also generally happy with neighborhood public schools.
DeJarnatt, supra note 16, at 16 n.88. Data over several decades indicate that students in neighborhood public schools and choice schools alike have mixed educational attainment, with no particular
advantage to students in charter or voucher schools. MARTIN CARNOY, SCHOOL VOUCHERS ARE
NOT A PROVEN STRATEGY FOR IMPROVING STUDENT ACHIEVEMENT 1, 3–7, 10 (2017),
http://www.epi.org/publication/school-vouchers-are-not-a-proven-strategy-for-improving-studentachievement/; CTR. FOR RESEARCH ON EDUC. OUTCOMES, MULTIPLE CHOICE: CHARTER SCHOOL
PERFORMANCE IN 16 STATES 1–6 (2009).
19. See, e.g., Elizabeth Adamo Usman, Reality over Ideology: A Practical View of Special
Needs Voucher Programs, 42 CAP. U. L. REV. 53, 77 (2014) (describing parents’ reasonable decisions to move their own children with special education needs to private school). See generally
MCGROARTY, supra note 11 (describing the positive experiences of several families utilizing school
choice).
20. Derek W. Black, Charter Schools, Vouchers, and the Public Good, 48 WAKE FOREST L.
REV. 445, 447 (2013) (“Public education entails the provision of common experiences under conditions consistent with equal protection, due process, free speech, and religious neutrality. A consumer-based system allows for too much educational variation and opens the door to individual
biases that are contrary to public education.”).
21. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954); Black, supra note 16, at 1359, 1403.

476

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 78:470

tension between, on the one hand, parental interests in choosing the best publicly-funded educational options for their own children, and on the other,
public goals and constitutional requirements of equal treatment. Professor
Martha Minow of Harvard Law School identified ways in which the rhetoric
of school choice both promotes values of equality and liberty and serves to
“channel[]—or paper[] over—deep conflicts over religion, race, immigration, [and] national identity.” 22 Most recently, Professor Derek W. Black
identified ways in which school choice “stratif[ies] opportunity,” “intensif[ies] segregation,” and violates state constitutions that mandate that public
education be a “first-order right.” 23
Most school-choice advocates emphasize that they are advocating for
all students to have access to high-quality education. The Center for Education Reform, which advocates for school choice, states, “[O]ur [m]ission [is]
[t]o expand educational opportunities that lead to improved economic outcomes for all Americans, particularly our youth, ensuring that the conditions
are ripe for innovation, freedom and flexibility throughout U.S. education.” 24
The American Federation for Children Growth Fund, a national organization
that advocates for vouchers, state-funded scholarships to private schools, and
tax-credit programs to pay for private-school educations, describes its mission as, “To improve our nation’s K-12 education by advancing systemic and
sustainable public policy that empowers parents, particularly those in lowincome families, to choose the education they determine is best for their children.” 25
But, as noted above, and as will be shown in this Article, adequate options prove to be elusive for many students in choice systems. Rather than
increasing educational opportunity, broad school-choice programs can leave
students with inadequate educational opportunities. This is especially true
for children with disabilities. Ultimately, school choice sets the rights and
interests of some parents against the rights and interests of other parents in
ways that our current legal framework does not adequately address. Students
with disabilities, ostensibly protected by bipartisan-supported federal law, 26
are left to bear the brunt of this shortcoming.
This Article will address the rights of students with disabilities in light
of the ever-increasing movement towards greater school choice and suggests
22. Minow, supra note 16, at 816.
23. Black, supra note 16, at 1359.
24. About, CTR. FOR EDUC. REFORM, https://www.edreform.com/about/ (last visited Dec. 26,
2017).
25. About Us, AM. FED’N FOR CHILDREN GROWTH FUND, https://afcgrowthfund.org/about-us/
(last visited Dec. 26, 2017) (emphasis omitted).
26. See Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400–1421 (2012); Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213 (2012); Rehabilitation Act of 1973,
29 U.S.C. § 794 (2012).
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ways in which attorneys and policy makers should address the inequalities
that increase for students with disabilities within choice systems. The Article
will focus on state-funded school-choice programs, particularly charter
schools and voucher schemes. While there is now considerable data and information available about such programs, there is still relatively little legal
scholarship on the subject, particularly with regards to students with disabilities and federal laws that protect those students, such as the Individuals with
Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”). 27 Scholars have identified the problems of “skimming”—the almost inevitable fact of choice schools excluding
children with challenging learning needs and serving higher achieving children than their public-school counterparts. 28 In this process, students with
disabilities are left out and left behind. Despite this, scholarship addressing
the rights of students with disabilities and the ways in which those rights interact with school-choice laws and realities is limited.
The legal rights of students with disabilities are intertwined with and
overlap with the rights of racial minorities. This is in part because minority
students are over identified as having disabilities as compared to their white
peers, 29 but primarily because federal and state constitutional principles of
equality protect both racial minorities and students with disabilities. 30 For
students with disabilities, those protections are defined through comprehensive federal and state laws supported by politicians from both major parties.31
27. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400–1482 (2012). Current, informative scholarship on private school
voucher programs includes a focus on Milwaukee’s voucher program and the lawsuits that have
challenged that program. Compare Wendy F. Hensel, The Limits of Federal Disability Law: State
Educational Voucher Programs, 44 J.L. & EDUC. 199, 200–05 (2015), with Stephen A. Rosenbaum,
Preserving Public Values in the Private Sector: Unintended Consequences or Vouching for Ableism-Free Schools?, 45 J.L. & EDUC. 369, 373–81 (2016). See generally Julie F. Mead, Private in
Name Only: A Statutory and Constitutional Analysis of Milwaukee’s Private School Voucher Program, 21 WASH. & LEE J. C.R. & SOC. JUST. 331 (2015).
28. See, e.g., Note, The Limits of Choice: School Choice Reform and State Constitutional
Guarantees of Educational Quality, 109 HARV. L. REV. 2002, 2006–09 (1996) (identifying policies
that lead to skimming).
29. See, e.g., Ama Mazama & Garvey Lundy, African American Homeschooling as Racial
Protectionism, 43 J. BLACK STUD. 723, 727–28 (2012) (“African American students are more than
twice as likely to be labeled ‘mentally retarded’ as European American students, and although they
make up only [seventeen percent] of the student population, they nonetheless represent [thirty-three
percent] of those enrolled in programs for children with mental retardation.” (citations omitted));
John McKenna, The Disproportionate Representation of African Americans in Programs for Students with Emotional and Behavioral Disorders, 57 PREVENTING SCH. FAILURE 206, 206 (2013)
(“African American students are disproportionally represented in educational programs for students
meeting eligibility criteria for emotional disturbance.”).
30. See, e.g., Betty Y. Ashbaker, History of Legal and Legislative Acts Concerned with Special
Education, in HISTORY OF SPECIAL EDUCATION 21, 21–45 (Anthony F. Rotatori et al. eds., 2011);
Steven L. Nelson, Special Education Reform Policies and the Permanence of Oppression: A Critical
Race Case Study of Special Education Reform in Shelby County, Tennessee, 60 HOW. L.J. 459, 461–
62 (2017).
31. See Individuals with Disabilities Education Improvement Act of 2004, H.R. 1350, 108th
Cong. (showing that the law passed with overwhelming majorities in both the U.S. Senate and the
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Specifically, tailored legislation and regulation could possibly allow the positive goals of school choice—innovation and parental freedom to choose—to
flourish, while inhibiting negative outcomes like racial segregation and marginalization of students with disabilities.
Addressing shortcomings in school-choice policies is more important
than ever given the current momentum towards increasing school-choice programs. Recent decisions by the United States Supreme Court create an environment more favorable than ever to school choice by affirming the legitimacy of funding schemes that direct public money to private and parochial
schools. 32 Politically and financially influential interest groups and individuals, such as Jeb Bush, Betsy DeVos, the Walton Family Foundation, and the
Goldwater Institute, are heavily invested in promoting school choice. 33 The
federal government also supports school choice. For example, former President Barack Obama’s administration implemented “Race to the Top,” a fund
providing grants to states implementing specific reforms, such as improving
assessments and data systems. 34 This fund promoted the creation of charter
schools, which are schools established according to state law and funded by
the state. 35 Furthermore, Betsy DeVos is a self-proclaimed advocate of
school choice, including vouchers. 36 Particularly at a time when policy makers at the federal level are led by people who would like to see the traditional

House of Representatives); see also Roll Call Vote 108th Congress-2nd Session, U.S. SENATE,
https://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/roll_call_lists/roll_call_vote_cfm.cfm?congress=108&session=2&vote=00094 (last visited Jan. 9, 2019); Final Vote Results for Roll Call 154, OFF. CLERK U.S. HOUSE
REPRESENTATIVES, http://clerk.house.gov/evs/2003/roll154.xml (last visited Jan. 9, 2019).
32. Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, 137 S. Ct. 2012, 2019–25 (2017)
(requiring that a state allow religious entities to compete for grants of public money alongside secular organizations); Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 649–52 (2002) (determining that
public funds could be used to pay for religious education as long as parents directed the money
through the use of vouchers); see also Emma Brown, Why Betsy DeVos Is Cheering the Supreme
Court’s Church Playground Decision, WASH. POST (June 27, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/education/wp/2017/06/26/why-betsy-devos-is-cheering-the-supreme-courtschurch-playground-decision/?utm_term=.9b662dcb6f4d (“Voucher advocates said that line of reasoning opens the way for the high court to rule in favor of allowing public funds to flow to parochial
schools.”).
33. RAVITCH, supra note 14, at 22–23; ROOKS, supra note 17, at 154–59; SCHNEIDER, supra
note 14, at 69–78.
34. Race to the Top, OBAMA WHITE HOUSE, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/issues/education/k-12/race-to-the-top (last visited Feb. 15, 2019); SCHNEIDER, supra note 14, at 65–66.
35. See, e.g., Katrina E. Bulkley, Charter Schools . . . Taking a Closer Look, 77 EDUC. DIG.
58, 58 (2012) (“[T]he Obama administration has highlighted charter schools under its Race to the
Top fund and in regulations for its School Improvement Grant program.”). Charter schools are
“public” schools but are run independently from and with greater freedom than traditional public
schools. Id.
36. Chris Weller, New Education Secretary Betsy DeVos Champions Vouchers and Charter
Schools—Here’s What That Means, BUS. INSIDER (Feb. 7, 2017), http://www.businessinsider.com/what-are-charter-schools-2017-2.
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local-public-school model of public education replaced by choice systems, 37
it is important to understand the threat to the rights of special-education students created by broad school-choice policies and to mitigate that threat.
Part I of this Article will address the origins and history of school-choice
policies. A major goal of school-choice policies is to limit the hand of government, giving more freedom to educators and parents. At key moments,
however, school-choice policies have also deliberately or inadvertently exacerbated inequalities antithetical to well-established principles of law and
public policy. Knowing how this has happened provides us with a better
understanding of the importance of guarding those principles. Part II will
provide a brief history and overview of federal law protecting students with
disabilities, the IDEA; will introduce the legal requirement that students be
educated in their “least restrictive environment” (“LRE”); and will explain
the ways in which the funding structure of the IDEA is built around the structure of traditional public schools. Part III will discuss the interaction between
the IDEA and school choice, describing the ways that current school choice
laws and policies violate the spirit and letter of the IDEA and the constitutional principle of equal protection under the law. Part IV will elucidate the
competing interests and rights underlying debates about school choice. Finally, Part V will suggest ways in which attorneys can utilize the IDEA, and
the constitutional requirements underlying it, to insist on equal protection for
students with disabilities in school choice programs.
I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF SCHOOL CHOICE
A. Early School Choice
As public schools and compulsory attendance laws developed in the
early twentieth century in the United States,38 parents and private schools
challenged laws mandating that all children attend public schools. In 1925,
the Supreme Court, in Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 39 agreed that children
should not be required to attend public school to the exclusion of private or
religious schooling and established the principle that parents have a constitutional right to direct the upbringing and education of their children absent a
compelling state reason to the contrary. 40 This decision did not, however,
37. Valerie Strauss, DeVos: Picking a School Should Be Like Choosing Among Uber, Lyft or
a Taxi, WASH. POST (Mar. 29, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/answersheet/wp/2017/03/29/devos-picking-a-school-should-be-like-choosing-among-uber-lyft-or-ataxi/?utm_term=.ae2b1c905bda.
38. DAVID B. TYACK, THE ONE BEST SYSTEM: A HISTORY OF AMERICAN URBAN EDUCATION
15–39, 66–68 (1974).
39. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
40. Id. at 534–35 (“[W]e think it entirely plain that the Act of 1922 unreasonably interferes
with the liberty of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and education of children under
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open the door to public funding of private and parochial schools. Public
funding remained limited to public schools. 41
The push to fund private education with state money came several decades after Pierce, following the landmark 1954 Supreme Court case, Brown
v. Board of Education. 42 In Brown, the Court held that racially segregated
schools were inherently unequal and violated the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution. 43 This decision set off decades of federal court monitoring of state and local efforts to desegregate or
avoid desegregating their schools. 44
The year after Brown, Milton Friedman, an economist at the University
of Chicago, known for his advocacy of free-market capitalism and widely
considered the “father of school choice,” began writing on the issue. 45 In a
1955 essay, he theorized that government was overly involved in education
and proposed an early version of vouchers: A system of state-funded subsidies that parents could use to fund a school of their choice, including parochial schools. 46 Friedman theorized, “The adoption of such arrangements
would make for more effective competition among various types of schools
and for a more efficient utilization of their resources.” 47
It was not long before southern states, seeking to avoid racial integration
of public schools following Brown, began using the rhetoric and ideas for
school choice in the United States more broadly. In the 1950s and 1960s,
states including Virginia, South Carolina, Alabama, and Louisiana passed
legislation and amended state constitutions to allow or even force school districts to close in the face of court orders to desegregate. 48 They authorized
vouchers to fund racially segregated private schools. 49 The language of
choice was common in state efforts to prevent full desegregation. South Carolina’s act began with a broad statement of choice:
their control. As often heretofore pointed out, rights guaranteed by the Constitution may not be
abridged by legislation which has no reasonable relation to some purpose within the competency of
the State. The fundamental theory of liberty upon which all governments in this Union repose
excludes any general power of the State to standardize its children by forcing them to accept instruction from public teachers only. The child is not the mere creature of the State; those who
nurture him and direct his destiny have the right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare him for additional obligations.”).
41. Minow, supra note 16, at 819–20.
42. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
43. Id. at 495.
44. GARY ORFIELD ET AL., DISMANTLING DESEGREGATION xxi–xxiii (1996) (listing significant federal court cases regarding desegregation orders).
45. SCHNEIDER, supra note 14, at 27–29.
46. Milton Friedman, The Role of Government in Education, in ECONOMICS AND THE PUBLIC
INTEREST 123 (Robert A. Solo ed., 1955).
47. Id. at 134.
48. SCHNEIDER, supra note 14, at 16–25.
49. Id.; Minow, supra note 16, at 821–24.
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The General Assembly finds that the cause of primary and secondary education in South Carolina will be advanced if individual children of school age, their parents and guardians, are made free to
choose between public and private educational institutions. Provision has been made for the transfer of pupils from one public
school to another, subject to such limitations as may be necessitated by local conditions, and it is considered highly desirable that
the freedom to choose among available educational institutions be
extended and enlarged by providing scholarship grants for children
entitled to attend primary and secondary public schools who wish
to attend private or independent institutions, such scholarship
grants to be furnished from State funds supplemented by local
school districts. 50
These voucher laws did not last long. State and federal courts, including
the Supreme Court, declared the actions of states that closed public schools
in favor of vouchers for private schools unconstitutional insofar as they were
designed primarily to maintain segregated schools. 51 The Supreme Court
held that closing some public schools and requiring that students go to segregated private schools with state funding denied these children equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution. 52 The United
States District Court for the District of South Carolina saw through the language of choice in South Carolina’s act and determined that the clear motivation behind the act was to avoid desegregation. The court held:
A review of the record, including the historical background of the
Act, clearly reveals that the purpose, motive and effect of the Act
is to unconstitutionally circumvent the requirement . . . that the

50. Brown v. S.C. State Bd. of Educ., 296 F. Supp. 199, 200 n.1 (D.S.C. 1968) (emphasis
added) (quoting 1963 S.C. Acts 498–500).
51. See, e.g., Griffin v. Cty. Sch. Bd., 377 U.S. 218, 231 (1964) (“Whatever nonracial grounds
might support a State's allowing a county to abandon public schools, the object must be a constitutional one, and grounds of race and opposition to desegregation do not qualify as constitutional.”);
Hall v. St. Helena Parish Sch. Bd., 197 F. Supp. 649, 651 (E.D. La. 1961) (finding a Louisiana act
tasking “the school board of the parish where the public schools have been ‘closed’ . . . with responsibility for furnishing free lunches, transportation, and grants-in-aid to . . . children attending . . .
‘private’ schools” to be “a transparent artifice designed to deny the plaintiffs their declared constitutional right to attend desegregated public schools”); James v. Almond, 170 F. Supp. 331, 338
(E.D. Va. 1959) (“[N]o one public school or grade in the county or city may be closed to avoid the
effect of the law of the land while other public schools or grades remain open at the expense of the
taxpayers.”); Harrison v. Day, 106 S.E.2d 636 (Va. 1959) (holding that the Virginia constitution
required the state to maintain public schools but allowed the state to make tuition grants to private
schools).
52. Griffin, 377 U.S. at 230–31.
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State of South Carolina not discriminate on the basis of race or
color in its public educational system. 53
Voucher programs withered following these decisions. 54
B. School Choice Moves into the Mainstream
The charter-school movement propelled school choice into the mainstream in the 1990s. Developed in the 1980s primarily by Ray Budde, a professor of education at the University of Massachusetts, and then American
Federation of Teachers President Albert Shanker, the original concept of
charter schools envisioned teacher-designed and run schools that would have
freedom to innovate. 55 In Budde and Shanker’s conception of charter
schools, parents would have the option to send or not send their children to
these experimental, teacher-run schools, thus “empower[ing] both teachers
and parents.” 56 As in Friedman’s proposal for a voucher system, the goal
was to foster innovation by reducing government oversight. Shanker also
supported giving parents the ability to “shop around” amongst public
schools. 57
The first state charter-school law was passed in Minnesota in 1991, and
the first charter school opened there in the 1992 to 1993 school year. 58 Charter-school laws were quickly passed in other states, including California,
New York, Colorado, and Michigan. 59 Conceptually, charter schools were
viewed as healthy competition to local schools, enrolling students from

53. Brown, 296 F. Supp. at 202–03. Later, some school boards also attempted to use choice as
the primary means of desegregating their schools, a mechanism that proved ineffective at best and
disingenuous at worst. Minow, supra note 16, at 824–29. The Supreme Court noted that a Virginia
“freedom of choice” plan, which a defendant school board claimed was an effort to desegregate
rather than maintain segregation, had not been shown to be effective and held that “if there are
reasonably available other ways, such . . . as zoning, . . . ‘freedom of choice’ must be held unacceptable.” Green v. Cty. Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 439–42 (1968). The federal courts later also
rejected magnet programs as a tool of integration. See, e.g., Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70 (1995)
(reversing a district court decision ordering a comprehensive magnet program to address segregation between city and suburban schools in the Kansas City metropolitan area).
54. A few states tried to use vouchers and magnet schools to desegregate their schools, but
federal courts largely deemed those steps inadequate after an attempt to use a voucher program to
meet desegregation requirements was struck down by the Supreme Court in Green. See supra note
53; see also Minow, supra note 16, at 824–29 (describing court actions).
55. SCHNEIDER, supra note 14, at 46–52.
56. Id. at 52, 60.
57. William K. Stevens, Shanker Proposes Parents Be Allowed to Pick Child’s School, N.Y.
TIMES (Feb. 7, 1971), http://www.nytimes.com/1971/02/07/archives/shanker-proposes-parents-beallowed-to-pick-childs-school.html?_r=0.
58. EILEEN M. AHEARN ET AL., SPECIAL EDUCATION AS REQUIREMENTS IN CHARTER
SCHOOLS: FINAL REPORT OF A RESEARCH STUDY 4 (2001), http://www.nasdse.org/Portals/0/Documents/ProjectSearch.pdf.
59. SCHNEIDER, supra note 14, at 59–63.
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across public school districts. 60 Indeed, “[m]ost state charter-authorizing
statutes specifically identify expanding choice options as a reason for creating charter schools.” 61
Despite the initial conception of the charter school as a sort of laboratory
of innovative education, in practice, this has not been their most significant
role. Charter schools are often used to replace public schools in reorganizations of struggling urban school districts. 62 After Hurricane Katrina, New
Orleans replaced its entire school district with a choice-based district, the
“Recovery School District” (“RSD”). 63 As will be discussed below, this kind
of broad use of school choice is especially constraining for parents seeking
integrated schools that will meet their children’s educational needs. Even in
cities that are not replacing large numbers of public schools with charter
schools, large organizations, like the Knowledge is Power Program (“KIPP”)
and the for-profit Edison Project, have dominated charter-school development, 64 not local teachers.
Vouchers and tuition tax credits have been used in recent decades to
facilitate government funding of private schools. 65 Tax credits allow parents
to deduct tuition paid to private schools when they file their income taxes. 66
These tax credits benefit primarily upper-income families who pay significant amounts of income tax and can afford to pay for private schools in the
first place. 67 Vouchers provide direct public funding to private schools by
giving parents the option of directing a certain amount of public money for
their child to go to a school of their choosing. Objections to such funding

60. Robert A. Garda, Jr., Culture Clash: Special Education in Charter Schools, 90 N.C. L.
REV. 655, 667 (2012).
61. Id. (citing state statutes such as 105 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/27A-2(b)(6), IND. CODE
ANN. § 20-24-2-1(2), and N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 2850(2)(e) (McKinney 2009)).
62. Danielle Holley-Walker, The Accountability Cycle: The Recovery School District Act and
New Orleans’ Charter Schools, 40 CONN. L. REV. 125, 142–47, 155–57 (2007); see also ABRAMS,
supra note 17, at 55–95 (describing the ultimately unsuccessful takeover of four Baltimore schools
by a for-profit charter school enterprise, the Edison Project).
63. Alice Huff, Re-forming the Post-Political City?, in ONLY IN NEW ORLEANS 87–102 (Luis
Mirón et al. eds., 2015); see also OSBORNE, supra note 12, at 27–33 (describing the financial and
physical destruction of the New Orleans public schools, which were already struggling financially
and academically, in the wake of Hurricane Katrina and the subsequent process of turning the school
district into the Recovery School District).
64. See, e.g., ABRAMS, supra note 17, at 55–95. KIPP’s students are almost entirely lowincome students of color in urban areas. ROOKS, supra note 17, at 44.
65. Matt Barnum, The Rise of Tax Credits: How Arizona Created an Alternative to School
Vouchers—and Why They’re Spreading, CHALKBEAT (Sept. 18, 2017), https://www.chalkbeat.org/posts/us/2017/09/18/the-rise-of-tax-credits-how-arizona-created-an-alternative-to-schoolvouchers-and-why-theyre-spreading/.
66. Isabel Chou, Comment, “Opportunity” for All?: How Tax Credit Scholarships will Fare
in New Jersey, 64 RUTGERS L. REV. 295, 305 (2011).
67. Mei-lan E. Wong, Note, The Implications of School Choice for Children with Disabilities,
103 YALE L.J. 827, 833–34 (1993).
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have not succeeded in the courts so long as the funding has been guided by
parents’ individual choice rather than decided by the state. In 2002, the Supreme Court opened the door to public funding for parochial schools, finding
that voucher programs do not violate the Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment to the Constitution as long as parents themselves select the
schools to receive funding on their behalf, not the state. 68
Since 2002, voucher programs have grown in the United States with
overwhelming legislative support. 69 As of 2014, fourteen states and the District of Columbia have legislation authorizing voucher programs. 70 That legislation was overwhelmingly passed after 2002. Charter schools have been
growing alongside voucher programs. Between 2000 and 2016, the number
of charter schools nationwide increased from four percent to seven percent
of all public schools. 71 As the number of charter schools grew, so did their
student bodies, as evidenced by increases in the number of charter schools
with large numbers of students. 72
In sum, school choice has a lengthy history as a tool through which interest groups with many different goals seek to shape public education.
School boards unsuccessfully attempted to use school choice to avoid courtordered desegregation. Parents have sought the right to educate their children
religiously, at first simply as a right to opt out of public education and more
recently as a right to use public funds for parochial schools. Charter schools
have been used to restructure large swaths of public-school districts. All of
these uses of school choice intersect with and impact the application of laws
designed to protect students with disabilities, which will be discussed below. 73

68. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 649–52 (2002) (“[W]here a government aid
program is neutral with respect to religion, and provides assistance directly to a broad class of citizens who, in turn, direct government aid to religious schools wholly as a result of their own genuine
and independent private choice, the program is not readily subject to challenge under the Establishment Clause.” (first citing Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983); then citing Witters v. Wash. Dep’t
of Servs. for Blind, 474 U.S. 481 (1986); and then citing Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist.,
509 U.S. 1 (1993)).
69. NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, SCHOOL VOUCHER LAWS: STATE-BYSTATE COMPARISON (2014), http://www.ncsl.org/documents/educ/StateByStateVoucherComparison.pdf. Two states, Maine and Vermont, have long-standing voucher programs that provide vouchers only to students who live in a town without a public school. Id.
70. Id.
71. Fast Facts, NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STAT., https://nces.ed.gov/fastfacts/display.asp?id=30
(last visited Feb. 23, 2018).
72. Id.
73. See supra Part III.
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II. IDEA HISTORY AND GOALS
A. History and Public Policy Rationale for the Principle of “Least
Restrictive Environment” in Special Education Law
As public schools became common in the nineteenth century, students
with special needs, including cognitive disabilities, vision impairments and
severe health problems, were educated in separate settings from their generaleducation peers. 74 Many children with disabilities were entirely excluded
from public schools. 75 Those who did attend public schools often did not
receive adequate instruction, as many public schools lacked sufficient resources. 76 In the first half of the twentieth century, most educators espoused
segregated education for students with special needs.77 It wasn’t until the
1940s that educators began to recognize the merits of integrating students
with disabilities with mainstream students. 78 Nevertheless, the education of
students with disabilities remained primarily institution based through the
1950s and into the 1960s. 79 During this time, national organizations, such as
the National Association of the Deaf, the National Association for Retarded
Children and the Council for Exceptional Children, pushed to change both
laws and public perception of people with disabilities. 80
Brown v. Board of Education, which ordered racial integration of public
schools, also prompted significant movement in federal law regarding the
education of children with disabilities on the principle of equal protection
under the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution. 81 Following the Supreme Court decision in Brown, federal courts articulated constitutional requirements for equal protection under the law for children with disabilities.
In 1972, the United States District Court for the District of Columbia ordered
that children with special needs had to be “provided with a publicly-supported education[]” and that state boards of education had a “clear duty to
include and retain these children in the public school system.” 82 Also in
1972, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
enforced a consent agreement that required that children with disabilities
have access to the same free, public education as provided to other children. 83
74. ROBERT L. OSGOOD, THE HISTORY OF INCLUSION IN THE UNITED STATES 22–33 (2005).
75. See, e.g., DEBORAH N. ARCHER & RICHARD D. MARSICO, SPECIAL EDUCATION LAW AND
PRACTICE 3 (2017).
76. 20 U.S.C. § 1400(c) (2012).
77. OSGOOD, supra note 74, at 25–31, 43.
78. Id. at 43–54.
79. Id. at 54–57.
80. Id. at 56–72.
81. Ashbaker, supra note 30, at 21–45; Nelson, supra note 30, at 460–61.
82. Mills v. Bd. of Educ., 348 F. Supp. 866, 876, 880 (D.D.C. 1972).
83. Pa. Ass’n for Retarded Children v. Pennsylvania, 343 F. Supp. 279 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
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Shortly after these decisions, Congress enacted the Rehabilitation Act
of 1973, 84 of which Section 504 bans discrimination on the basis of disability
by recipients of federal funding, including schools. 85 This was quickly followed by the passage of the Education for All Handicapped Children Act
(“EAHCA”) 86 in 1975, which emphasized a congressional preference for
teaching students with disabilities in a mainstream classroom. 87 These laws
were enacted before any decision was made by the Supreme Court on the
requirements of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
as pertaining to students with disabilities.
The clearly articulated federal preference for “mainstreaming” 88 continues today. 89 The IDEA, the successor of the EAHCA, states: “Almost [thirty]
years of research and experience has demonstrated that the education of children with disabilities can be made more effective by . . . having high expectations for such children and ensuring their access to the general education
curriculum in the regular classroom, to the maximum extent possible.” 90
The preference for mainstreaming students with disabilities is also recognized internationally. In 1994, representatives of ninety-two countries met
under the auspices of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural
Organization (“UNESCO”) and created the Salamanca Statement, saying,
among other things,
[T]hose with special educational needs must have access to regular
schools which should accommodate them within a childcentered
pedagogy capable of meeting these needs, [and] regular schools
with this inclusive orientation are the most effective means of combating discriminatory attitudes, creating welcoming communities,
building an inclusive society and achieving education for all; more-

84. Pub. L. No. 101-476, 104 Stat. 1142 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 29
U.S.C.).
85. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (2012); Wong, supra note 67, at 838.
86. Pub. L. No. 94-142, 89 Stat. 773 (1975) (amended 1990).
87. See Daniel J. Losen & Kevin G. Welner, Disabling Discrimination in Our Public Schools:
Comprehensive Legal Challenges to Inappropriate and Inadequate Special Education Services for
Minority Children, 36 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 407, 425 (2001) (“[S]pecial classes, separate
schooling, or other removal of children with disabilities from the regular education environment
occurs only when the nature or severity of the disability of a child is such that education in regular
classes with the use of supplementary aids and services cannot be achieved satisfactorily.” (alteration in original) (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5)(A) (1994))).
88. “Mainstreaming” is a term for integrating special education students into general education
classrooms and providing educational support in that environment as much as possible. What Does
Mainstreaming Mean?, MASTERS IN SPECIAL EDUC., https://www.masters-in-special-education.com/faq/what-does-mainstreaming-mean/ (last visited Feb. 18, 2019).
89. Theresa Glennon, Race, Education, and the Construction of a Disabled Class, 1995 WIS.
L. REV. 1237, 1239–41 (1995); Losen & Welner, supra note 87, at 425.
90. 20 U.S.C. § 1400(c)(5) (2012).
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over, they provide an effective education to the majority of children and improve the efficiency and ultimately the cost-effectiveness of the entire education system. 91
Countries worldwide are increasingly moving towards these ideals in practice. 92
B. Current Law
Federal law, primarily the IDEA, governs special education. 93 All states
have enacted statutes that conform with the IDEA. 94 The Americans with
Disabilities Act (“ADA”) 95 and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act 96 also
provide protections for students with disabilities. Unlike the IDEA, which
applies only to public schools, Section 504 applies to all schools that receive
federal funds. 97 Similarly, the ADA applies to all places of education that
affect commerce, 98 though “religious organizations or entities controlled by
religious organizations” are exempted. 99
The IDEA, however, provides far more protections for students with
disabilities than the ADA or Section 504. 100 The core requirement of the
IDEA is that states must provide all students with disabilities a free, appropriate public education (“FAPE”). 101 To provide a FAPE, a public school
must create and implement educational programs designed for a student to

91. World Conference on Special Needs Education: Access and Quality, The Salamanca Statement and Framework for Action on Special Needs Education, viii–ix, U.N. Doc. ED-94/WS/18
(June 7–10, 1994).
92. Nienke M. Ruijs & Thea T.D. Peetsma, Effects of Inclusion on Students with and Without
Special Educational Needs Reviewed, 4 EDUC. RES. REV. 67, 67–68 (2009).
93. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400–1482.
94. Terry Jean Seligmann, Muddy Waters: The Supreme Court and the Clear Statement Rule
for Spending Clause Legislation, 84 TUL. L. REV. 1067, 1091–92 (2010). The IDEA is rooted in
federal constitutional requirements for equal protection and due process. Id. at 1092; see also 20
U.S.C. § 1400(c)(6) (“While States, local educational agencies, and educational service agencies
are primarily responsible for providing an education for all children with disabilities, it is in the
national interest that the Federal Government have a supporting role in assisting State and local
efforts to educate children with disabilities in order to improve results for such children and to ensure equal protection of the law.”).
95. Equal Opportunity for Individuals with Disabilities (Americans with Disabilities Act of
1990), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213 (2012).
96. 29 U.S.C. §§ 701, 794 (2012).
97. Id. § 794.
98. 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7) (2012).
99. Id. § 12187.
100. The ADA and Section 504 are primarily anti-discrimination laws, while the IDEA provides
affirmative and funded mandates to provide appropriate education to special education students. 20
U.S.C. § 1412 (2012).
101. Id. § 1412(a)(1).
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make appropriate progress that is “merely more than de minimis.” 102 One of
the central features of the IDEA is the requirement that students with disabilities be educated in their LRE. This means that they should be educated with
general education peers as much as possible, only being removed when absolutely necessary for the students to make progress. 103
Inclusive special education is far from perfect in the United States.
Stigma attached to students identified as having disabilities results in lowered
teacher expectations and can possibly account for lower academic performance. 104 Parents, who are generally more concerned about stigmatization
and segregation of their children than are educators, often resist defining their
children through the label of disability. 105 Educators, on the other hand, tend
to see disability labels as useful tools for identifying educational needs. 106
This can slip into a preference for removing students with disabilities from
the general education classroom. As a 2015 study of implementation of the
LRE mandate noted in the discussion:
Teachers should . . . be aware of the over-reliance on the use of
separate environments for students as a mechanism to relieve their
perceived student frustration. . . . When special educators retreat
into their separate habitats, they leave general education teachers
without the resources and supports necessary to make their academic and social environments healthy for all students. 107
102. Endrew F. v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist., 137 S. Ct. 988, 1000–01 (2017); Bd. of Educ. v.
Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 203–04 (1982).
103. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5)(A) (“To the maximum extent appropriate, children with disabilities, including children in public or private institutions or other care facilities, are educated with
children who are not disabled, and special classes, separate schooling, or other removal of children
with disabilities from the regular educational environment occurs only when the nature or severity
of the disability of a child is such that education in regular classes with the use of supplementary
aids and services cannot be achieved satisfactorily.”).
104. See, e.g., Dara Shifrer, Stigma of a Label: Educational Expectations for High School Students Labeled with Learning Disabilities, 54 J. HEALTH & SOC. BEHAV. 462 (2013) (describing
lowered expectations for students carrying learning disability label). Stigma and segregation also
limit students’ social opportunities. See, e.g., Priya Lalvani, Disability, Stigma and Otherness: Perspectives of Parents and Teachers, 62 INT’L J. DISABILITY, DEV. & EDUC. 379, 384–86 (2015).
105. Lalvani, supra note 104, at 382–85 (discussing how parents of children with disabilities
tend to position their children in terms of their similarities with other children).
106. Id. Educators often attribute parents’ insistence on maximizing their children’s opportunities as “denial” about their children’s disabilities. Id. at 388–89; see also James M. Kauffman &
Jeanmarie Badar, How We Might Make Special Education for Students with Emotional or Behavioral Disorders Less Stigmatizing, 39 BEHAV. DISORDERS 16, 16, 18–22 (2013) (recommending
using plain language to talk about differences, “accepting the reality” and recognizing value of special educators’ skills to reduce “stigma”).
107. Laura C. O’Laughlin, The Least Restrictive Environment Clause of the Individuals with
Disabilities Education Act and Institutional Ableism 126 (May 2013) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,
Clemson
University),
https://tigerprints.clemson.edu/all_dissertations/1114/?utm_source=tigerprints.clemson.edu%2Fall_dissertations%2F1114&utm_medium=PDF&utm_campaign=PDFCoverPages.
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Parents whose children do not receive an appropriate special education
in their LRE can bring a complaint through an administrative process. 108 Parents can ask an administrative hearing officer to order either a change in their
child’s IEP, 109 compensatory services (like tutoring to help a child catch up
on what they theoretically would have learned had an appropriate education
been provided), or tuition for a private school that meets the student’s
needs. 110 In order to obtain tuition to a private school, parents have to show
that the private school is appropriate, although private schools are not subject
to the same requirements as public schools and do not have to educate students in their LRE. 111
C. Explanation of Local Education Agencies and their Basic
Obligations to Students with Special Needs
Local Education Agencies (“LEAs”) are administrative agencies or
other units that administer groups of public schools. 112 LEAs are responsible
for implementing federal special education requirements—for providing students with disabilities with a FAPE—and are the units to which funding is
distributed (through states) for such purposes. 113 The most common LEAs
are school districts. When passing the EAHCA, the predecessor to the IDEA,
in 1975, Congress recognized the importance of economies of scale. 114 It
required small school districts to form consolidated programs to comply with

108. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(6); 34 C.F.R. § 300.507(a) (2018); see also Perry A. Zirkel, The Remedial Authority of Hearing and Review Officers Under the Individuals with Disabilities Education
Act, 58 ADMIN. L. REV. 401, 402–03 (2006) (“The cornerstone for resolving disputes between parents and districts as to eligibility, FAPE, and other issues under the IDEA, is an impartial administrative adjudication conducted by a hearing/review officer (H/RO). The IDEA gives states the
choice of having a one-tiered system, consisting solely of an impartial due process hearing, or a
two-tiered system, which includes an additional officer level review. Subsequent to exhausting this
administrative adjudication, the aggrieved party has the right to judicial review in state or federal
court.” (footnotes omitted)).
109. An IEP is a plan that lays out, among other things, a student’s educational setting, services,
and goals. Under federal law, each IEP must be reconsidered and written anew annually by a team
that includes the child’s parent and teacher. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(a)(2)(B).
110. Zirkel, supra note 108, at 408–16 (describing the authority of the hearing officer to order
various types of injunctive relief).
111. Forest Grove Sch. Dist. v. T.A., 557 U.S. 230 (2009); Florence Cty. Sch. Dist. v. Carter,
510 U.S. 7, 15 (1993).
112. 20 U.S.C. § 7801(26)(A) (defining LEAs as “public board of education or other public
authority legally constituted within a State for either administrative control or direction of, or to
perform a service function for, public elementary schools or secondary schools in a city, county,
township, school district, or other political subdivision of a State, or of or for a combination of
school districts or counties that is recognized in a State as an administrative agency for its public
elementary schools or secondary schools”).
113. 20 U.S.C. § 1413.
114. Garda, supra note 60, at 671.
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the EAHCA’s mandates. 115 Larger LEAs are able to pool resources, for example, by grouping students with particular needs together in a school with
specialized teachers and services providers,116 which helps them allocate
these resources to students more efficiently.
These efficiencies all but disappear in the charter school realm. Charter
schools are established by state law. They are fairly new to the U.S. education system, having first been established in the 1990s. 117 While federal laws
regarding students with disabilities apply to charter schools, 118 they are not
necessarily designed to be compatible with these federal laws, leading one
scholar to call charter schools the “square peg” in the “round hole” of special
education. 119 States handle the question of charter schools’ LEA status differently. Some states require charter schools to be part of a larger LEA, while
others establish charter schools as their own LEA. 120 Still others allow charter schools to choose between being part of a larger LEA or being their own
LEA. 121 When a charter school is its own LEA, the charter school must provide services to students with disabilities itself.122 When part of a larger LEA,
the LEA retains the responsibility of providing appropriate services to students with disabilities. 123 While the IDEA encourages states to require small
LEAs that are not “of sufficient size and scope to effectively meet the needs
of children with disabilities” to combine with other LEAs to provide adequate
special education services to students, as of 1997, the IDEA excludes charter
schools from this provision, saying that state educational agencies cannot require charter schools to combine with other LEAs unless “explicitly permitted to do so under the State’s charter school law.” 124
115.
116.
117.
118.

Id.
See, e.g., id. at 703.
AHEARN ET AL., supra note 58, at 4.
34 C.F.R. § 300.209 (2018); U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS
ABOUT THE RIGHTS OF STUDENTS WITH DISABILITIES IN PUBLIC CHARTER SCHOOLS UNDER THE
INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES EDUCATION ACT (2016), https://www2.ed.gov/policy/speced/guid/idea/memosdcltrs/faq-idea-charter-school.pdf (providing guidance regarding 20
U.S.C. §§ 1400 et. seq. and 34 C.F.R. Part 300).
119. Garda, supra note 60, at 655–67.
120. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-12-543, CHARTER SCHOOLS: ADDITIONAL
FEDERAL ATTENTION NEEDED TO HELP PROTECT ACCESS FOR STUDENTS WITH DISABILITIES 3–4
(2012).
121. Id. In this report, the Government Accountability Office, in consultation with the Department of Education, evaluated the under representation of students with disabilities in charter schools
and concluded that action should be taken to encourage charter schools to better serve students with
disabilities. Id. at 21–22.
122. Id. at 3–4.
123. Id. at 4.
124. 20 U.S.C. § 1413(e)(1) (2012). The IDEA states:
A State educational agency may require a local educational agency to establish its
eligibility jointly with another local educational agency if the State educational agency
determines that the local educational agency will be ineligible under this section because
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Unlike charter schools, private and parochial schools are not themselves
regulated under the IDEA and are under no obligation to provide students
with disabilities with a FAPE or any other standard of education.125 On the
other hand, LEAs are required to provide services to students with disabilities
in private schools to some extent. LEAs are responsible for finding, evaluating, and offering services to all children with disabilities in their enrollment
district 126 and for providing services to children with special needs who are
enrolled in private schools, provided that the expenditure not benefit the
school as a whole or the general education population of the private school. 127
III. INTERACTION OF THE IDEA WITH SCHOOL CHOICE
In any system dominated by private and charter-school options, students
with disabilities, particularly disabilities that require more intensive school
resources such as autism and intellectual disabilities, will have inadequate
opportunities to be educated in their LRE. Both charter schools and private
schools accept a lower share of students with special needs than are served in
public schools. 128 Skimming—which we see happening in charter schools
despite current federal mandates and which is entirely legal in private
schools—is already restricting the choices of students with disabilities, denying them equal opportunities. 129 Current remedies are inadequate to confront
the problem. The only way to address a failure to place a student in their
LRE is to order a school district to place a student appropriately in a more
mainstreamed environment—something that can only happen if there is appropriate placement available. As it stands, too few choice schools offer students with disabilities appropriate placements.

the local educational agency will not be able to establish and maintain programs of sufficient size and scope to effectively meet the needs of children with disabilities.
Id. § 1413(e)(1)(A). The charter school exception states: “A State educational agency may not
require a charter school that is a local educational agency to jointly establish its eligibility under
subparagraph (A) unless the charter school is explicitly permitted to do so under the State’s charter
school law.” Id. § 1413(e)(1)(B); see also Garda, supra note 60, at 671–72 (citing Individuals with
Disabilities Education Act Amendments of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-17, § 613(e)(2), 111 Stat. 37, 76
(codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. § 1413(e)(1)(B) (2006))).
125. E.g., Special Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. R.M.M., 861 F.3d 769, 772 (8th Cir. 2017).
126. 34 C.F.R. § 300.131 (2018). See generally U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., THE INDIVIDUALS WITH
DISABILITIES EDUCATION ACT: PROVISIONS RELATED TO CHILDREN WITH DISABILITIES
ENROLLED BY THEIR PARENTS IN PRIVATE SCHOOLS (2011), https://www2.ed.gov/admins/lead/speced/privateschools/idea.pdf.
127. 34 C.F.R. § 300.141.
128. See infra notes 129–133 and accompanying text.
129. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.

492

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 78:470

A. Charter Schools’ Limitations for Students with Disabilities
Enrollment statistics indicate that charter schools underserve the population of students with special needs. 130 As a whole, students with disabilities
make up a smaller percentage of total students in charter schools than they
do in public schools. 131 A study, commissioned by a charter-school network,
found that in New York “[t]he average rate of enrollment of students with
disabilities in charter schools (14.3[%]) falls below the average enrollment
rate in the district-run schools (18.2[%]).” 132 Similar discrepancies have been
found in other localities. 133 Moreover, a disproportionate number of students
with disabilities who attend charter schools enroll in specialty charter schools
with high numbers of students with special needs. 134 This likely indicates
that the charter school population is even more segregated with regards to
students with disabilities than the overall enrollment numbers indicate because overall enrollment averages do not account for segregation of students
with disabilities into specialty charter schools.
Charter schools face practical barriers to fully serving students with disabilities, especially students whose disabilities require costly support. As
Professor Robert Garda, Jr. notes, “[The IDEA] presumed the existence of a
district with a bureaucracy of sufficient size to handle burdensome procedural
requirements and to capitalize on economies of scale for service provision to

130. AHEARN ET AL., supra note 58, at 4–5; see also Garda, supra note 60, at 681–83 (citing
private and government findings showing that charter schools serve lower proportions of students
with special needs than public schools at both the national and state levels).
131. The United States Government Accountability Office examined enrollment of students
with special needs in all U.S. charter schools in the 2009 to 2010 school year. It found that 8.2% of
students in charter schools identified special needs, while 11.3% of the total public-school population identified special needs. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 120, at 6–7. Of
the entire school-age population, 11.2% identified special needs. Id.
132. LAKE ET AL., supra note 8, at 4.
133. See, e.g., Black, supra note 16, at 1385; Robert Garda, Searching for Equity amid a System
of Schools: The View from New Orleans, 42 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 613, 647 (2015) (“In 2010, charter
schools educated sixty percent of the public school students in New Orleans, but enrolled only
thirty-eight percent of the students with autism, thirty-seven percent of the students with severe
emotional disturbances, and twenty-three percent of the students with multiple disabilities.”).
134. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 120, at 8–9 (“We also found that, relative to traditional public schools, the proportion of charter schools that enrolled high percentages of
students with disabilities was lower overall and generally tapered off the greater the enrollment of
students with disabilities. Specifically, the enrollment of students with disabilities was [eight] to
[twelve] percent at [twenty-three] percent of charter schools and [thirty-four] percent of traditional
public schools. Further, when the enrollment of students with disabilities reached [twelve] to [sixteen] percent, about [thirteen] percent of charter schools compared to [twenty-five] percent of traditional public schools had these enrollment levels. However, when compared to traditional public
schools, a higher percentage of charter schools enrolled more than [twenty] percent of students with
disabilities. During an interview with Education, an official noted that there has been an increase
in charter schools for students with disabilities, such as schools for students with autism, for example, which may help explain this difference.”).
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disabled students.” 135 Public school districts are able to pool and disburse
resources, while “the limited resources and lack of economies of scale are
particularly problematic for public charter schools.” 136 The Government Accountability Office concurs: “Anecdotal accounts . . . suggest that some charter schools may be discouraging students with disabilities from enrolling and
denying admission to students with more severe disabilities because services
are too costly.” 137
Charter and other choice schools are also discouraged from enrolling
students with disabilities because the primary mechanism by which schools
are evaluated is through standardized test scores, and test scores for students
with disabilities tend to be lower than those of general education students. 138
Test scores vary between students, and the average test scores for students
diagnosed with some disabilities, like speech and language disorders, are
higher than those of students diagnosed with other disabilities, like intellectual disabilities, giving charter and other choice schools further incentive to
educate only students who present as having disabilities that require fewer
resources than other students. 139
Given these realities, it is perhaps not surprising that charter schools
underserve students with disabilities. They reduce their special education
populations in several ways. For example, it is not uncommon for charter
schools to “counsel out” students with disabilities, particularly disabilities
requiring more intensive services, by advising them that their needs would

135. Garda, supra note 60, at 670.
136. PAUL T. O’NEILL & LAUREN MORANDO RHIM, EQUITY AT SCALE: HOW PUBLIC
CHARTER SCHOOL NETWORKS CAN INNOVATE AND IMPROVE SERVICES FOR STUDENTS WITH
DISABILITIES
4–5
(2015),
https://static1.squarespace.com/static/52feb326e4b069fc72abb0c8/t/54d4f576e4b0fafca6766ce8/1
423242614524/equity_at_scale_011215.pdf (“Whereas a district may employ a variety of specialists and instructional and support staff at the school and district levels, an independent public charter
school is likely to have to make do with a single special education coordinator and a handful of
special education teachers.”).
137. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 120, at 12.
138. See, e.g., Garda, supra note 133, at 647 (“Accountability requirements create strong incentives to deny admission to . . . lower performing students.”). Being a teacher and administrator at a
private school serving low-income students made clear to me the importance of test scores even for
independently funded schools. Foundations and donors look to test scores, as do parents, to formally
and informally evaluate schools.
139. See Ellen L. Trexler, Categorical Differences in Statewide Standardized Testing Scores of
Students with Disabilities 67–69 (2013) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Keiser University)
(demonstrating differences in average standardized test scores across disability categories); Christian P. Wilkens, Students with Disabilities in Urban Massachusetts Charter Schools: Access, Inclusion, and Policy 12–15 (2009) (unpublished Ed.D. thesis, Harvard University) (noting significant
differences in enrollment in charter schools across disability categories).
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be better met elsewhere. 140 Charter schools can also actively shape their applicant pools through their marketing, their curricular focus, and their capacity to meet the needs of students with special needs. 141 If the school does not
offer classes and resources that students need, parents are less likely to enroll
their children in the school in the first place. Charter, magnet, and other
schools in choice systems also sometimes prefer students who paid tuition in
previous years, children who live in specific neighborhoods, and children
who qualify through test scores or other selective processes, among other
preferences. 142
Being underserved has concrete consequences for students with disabilities. The Southern Poverty Law Center conducted an analysis of the New
Orleans RSD, a fully choice school district, and found:
• Only 6.8% of RSD students with disabilities exit with a
high school diploma, while across the state, the average
is 19.4%.
• In the 2008–09 school year, RSD schools suspended
nearly 30% of all students with disabilities—a rate that
is 63% higher than the state average. . . .
• On average, school districts throughout Louisiana have
identified 12.2% of their students as eligible for special
education services. New Orleans Public Schools have
identified only 8% of their students as eligible for special
education services.
Comparable school districts
throughout the country identify almost twice as many
students with disabilities. 143
One woman in Louisiana described trying to obtain an appropriate education for her son in the New Orleans RSD:
140. See, e.g., Garda, supra note 60, at 686–87 (citing reports and lawsuits across numerous
states); Garda, supra note 133, at 639–43 (describing the impact of retention policies on students in
New Orleans).
141. Black, supra note 16, at 1383–84.
142. See, e.g., Garda, supra note 133, at 634–37 (describing selective admission processes that
continue to exist in New Orleans even after the process was simplified); W. David Stevens et al.,
Barriers to Access: High School Choice Process and Outcomes in Chicago, in SCHOOL CHOICE
AND SCHOOL IMPROVEMENT 125, 125–33 (Mark Berends et al. eds., 2011) (discussing ways that
parents’ choices for schooling were limited in Chicago).
143. SHAKTI BELWAY, S. POVERTY LAW CTR., ACCESS DENIED: NEW ORLEANS STUDENTS
PARENTS
IDENTIFY
BARRIERS
TO
PUBLIC
EDUCATION
10
(2010),
AND
https://www.splcenter.org/sites/default/files/d6_legacy_files/downloads/publication/SPLC_report_Access_Denied.pdf (footnotes omitted); see also Garda, supra note 133, at 646
(“[Charter schools] have long been blamed for denying admission to students with disabilities,
‘cherry-picking’ students with mild disabilities, providing a one-size-fits-all program instead of a
full continuum of placements, failing to follow proper disciplinary procedures, and failing to identify students as disabled. These accusations are particularly strong in New Orleans.” (footnotes
omitted)).
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The [RSD] told us about specific schools that would be appropriate
for our son but when we tried to enroll him, they were already full.
....
I’ve gone to eight different charter schools. Of those schools,
five said they would take my application but could not accommodate my son with disabilities. Another said they would work with
him but were stretched pretty thin.
Most charters said they don’t have the staffing, training or materials. One woman literally said, “I don’t think we’re hurting kids
with special needs but I know we’re not helping them. You don’t
want your son to go here.” 144
Other parents, whose seventeen-year-old son had an IEP for autism, described their son’s experience in a charter school:
One of the things the school principal made known to us was they
were going to treat him just like a regular kid. They were not going
to treat him like a special education student. They said they would
call the police on our son for anything he does wrong. And they
actually did call. And, it just went downhill after that.
....
After all of this has gone on, we’re very reluctant to let him stay
in school. He’s gotten to the point where he doesn’t want to stay
and we don’t want him to be there, so we’ll just let him transition
out and get him into something else, into a vocation. 145
State funding mechanisms tend to assume that the distribution of special-education students in charter schools and in district schools is equivalent,
resulting in over funding of charter schools. 146 Some states, like Massachusetts, distribute funds to charter schools based on the average cost of educating all students in a district. 147 This results in charter schools receiving equal
funds to educate relatively fewer students with high-cost educational needs.
Other states, like Pennsylvania, provide additional funds for students who
have IEPs, but those additional funds are also based on averages—the average cost to the sending school district for educating a child with disabilities. 148 The cost of special education varies widely across disabilities and
between individual students. Reimbursement for special-education students

144.
145.
146.
147.
148.

BELWAY, supra note 143, at 12.
Id. at 13.
See, e.g., Wilkens, supra note 139, at 18–19.
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 71, § 89(ff) (West 2018); Wilkens, supra note 139, at 20.
24 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 17-1725-A (West 2016).
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can be several times that of reimbursement for general-education students. 149
On the other hand, some students with disabilities require relatively low-cost
services, while others require very-high cost services, including dedicated
paraprofessionals. 150 Some charter-school funding, like Massachusetts’s and
Pennsylvania’s, is based on averages without concurrent requirements for
provision of services proportional to those provided by traditional public
schools. 151 As a result, charter schools are financially incentivized to enroll
students who have IEPs but whose needs can be met at relatively low-cost,
and disincentivized to serve students with higher-cost disabilities. 152
B. Private Schools
Private and parochial schools occupy a curious intersection with the
IDEA. In all but one scenario, private and parochial schools are not accountable for implementing any provisions of the IDEA. 153 Nonetheless, private
and parochial schools may provide, and be reimbursed by the state for, services for students with disabilities. 154
There are several routes by which students with disabilities may attend
private or parochial schools with some or all of their educational costs paid
for by the state. One option is for parents to place their children in a private
or parochial school at their own expense. In that situation, the LEA in which
a private school is located is responsible for identifying, evaluating, and, to
some extent, funding appropriate services to students with disabilities. 155 The
LEA may not pay for any instruction above and beyond the direct needs of
the student, however, and the funding may not go towards any administrative
costs or the instruction of general education students in the private or parochial school. 156 Another route by which students may attend private school
with funding from the state is for a parent to show, through an administrative
process, that the LEA responsible for their child has not provided a FAPE.
In that case, the LEA can agree or be ordered to pay tuition to an appropriate
private school for the school year during which the LEA did not provide the

149. Black, supra note 16, at 1371–72 (“Consider Morrisville Borough, for instance, where the
reimbursement for regular education students was $11,000 per pupil and $42,642 for special education students.” (citing Charter School Funding: 2016–2017 Tuition Rates, PENN. DEP’T OF
EDUC.,
http://www.education.pa.gov/K-12/Charter%20Schools/Pages/Charter-School-Funding.aspx#tab-1 (last visited Oct. 18, 2017))).
150. Id.
151. See id.; supra notes 146–147 and accompanying text.
152. Black, supra note 16, at 1370–72.
153. See 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(B) (2012).
154. 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.130–300.148 (2018).
155. Id. § 300.131.
156. Id. § 300.141.
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FAPE to which the child was entitled. 157 To obtain funding, a parent must
show that the private school can provide an appropriate education, but it need
not be in the child’s LRE. 158 Finally, in some states, parents can place their
children in private or parochial schools using vouchers or state-sponsored
scholarships, such as Florida’s McKay Scholarship. Parents who enroll their
children in private or parochial schools in this way lose the rights they would
otherwise have under the IDEA, just as they would if they were paying the
full tuition themselves.159 In only one situation do parents retain the full substantive and procedural rights provided by the IDEA: when LEAs, in agreement with the child’s parent, directly place students in private school pursuant to the child’s IEP. In that case, and in that case only, the private school,
in connection with the LEA, has an obligation to comply with the IDEA. 160
Private schools are not required to accept all students.161 Though they
must abide by the requirements of the ADA and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, they are responsible only for providing accommodations that
would not be an “undue burden” on the school and that would not “fundamentally alter” the nature of its services. 162 Private schools are free to establish their own admission criteria absent discrimination on the basis of race,

157. 20 U.S.C. § 1412; 34 C.F.R. § 300.148; Forest Grove Sch. Dist. v. T.A., 557 U.S. 230
(2009); Florence Cty. Sch. Dist. Four v. Carter, 510 U.S. 7 (1993).
158. 34 C.F.R. § 300.148; Florence, 510 U.S. at 13–15.
DEP’T
OF
EDUC.,
159. See
McKay
Scholarship
Program
FAQs,
FLA.
http://www.fldoe.org/schools/school-choice/k-12-scholarship-programs/mckay/mckay-faqs.stml
(last visited Feb. 19, 2018) (“A public school district’s obligations to a student with disabilities
placed in a private school by his or her parents are different from its responsibilities to a student
enrolled in public school. When a student with a disability withdraws from public school, the district is no longer obligated to provide all of the services contained in the student’s IEP. Districts are
required to spend a proportionate amount of IDEA federal funds to provide equitable services to
private school students; however, the amount and type of services may differ from the services the
student would receive if placed in a public school by the parents. The procedural safeguards for
parents of public-school students under IDEA are not in effect for parents of students in private
schools (with the exception of child find), including those private schools participating in state
scholarship programs. Parents of scholarship students are encouraged to take care to choose a private school that provides the curriculum, services, and educational approach that will meet the needs
of their students.”); see also IND. CODE § 20-51-4-4.5 (2016) (authorizing the transfer of special
education funds to private schools for choice scholarship recipients eligible for special education);
511 IND. ADMIN. CODE ANN. 7-34-6 (LexisNexis 2014) (stating that due process procedures are not
available for disputes regarding FAPE when parents place their children in private schools).
160. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(B); see also A.C. v. Scranton Sch. Dist., 191 F. Supp. 3d 375, 390
(M.D. Pa. 2016) (“Thus, since [Scranton School District (“SSD”)] placed, at its expense, A.C. in
New Story, a private facility allegedly contracted by SSD to provide education to district students,
plaintiffs have sufficiently shown that New Story was subject to the same statutory standard for
providing A.C. a FAPE as SSD.”).
161. See, e.g., Suzanne E. Eckes et al., Dollars to Discriminate: The (Un)intended Consequences of School Vouchers, 91 PEABODY J. EDUC. 537 (2016) (reviewing state voucher laws for
nondiscrimination provisions and finding few).
162. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A) (2012) (“[D]iscrimination includes . . . a failure to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary
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color, or national origin. 163 Many schools that utilize public funds through
vouchers openly discriminate against lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and
queer students. 164 Parents who want to participate in state voucher programs
must obtain admission for their child to the private school, just as anyone else
would. 165 If a private school can plausibly say that providing an appropriate
education to a student with a disability would be an “undue burden” or “fundamentally alter” the nature of its services, federal law does not require that
school to accept the student, even if the school receives some public funding. 166
In voucher programs, oversight of private and parochial schools is minimal. In 2017, the Orlando Sentinel published a comprehensive three-part
investigative report detailing problems resulting from the lack of oversight
of private schools participating in Florida voucher programs, including numerous cases of private schools providing inadequate educational services
under dubious circumstances. 167 Florida law expressly states, “It is the intent
of the Legislature not to regulate, control, approve, or accredit private educational institutions.” 168 The accountability requirements for private schools
to afford such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to individuals
with disabilities, unless the entity can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations; [and] a failure to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a
disability is excluded, denied services, segregated or otherwise treated differently than other individuals because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless the entity can demonstrate that
taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the good, service, facility, privilege, advantage, or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden . . . .”); see also Lynn
M. Daggett, “Minor Adjustments” and Other Not-So-Minor Obligations: Section 504, Private Religious K-12 Schools, and Students with Disabilities, 52 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 301, 314–20 (2014)
(describing the obligations of private schools under the ADA).
163. See, e.g., AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION OF MD., FACT SHEET ON PRIVATE SCHOOLS,
DISCRIMINATION AND THE LAW, https://www.aclu-md.org/sites/default/files/field_documents/nonpublic_schools_discrim_factsheet.pdf (last visited Mar. 7, 2019).
164. As many as a third of private schools in Georgia that accept vouchers have or are part of
organizations that have explicit anti-gay biases. S. EDUC. FOUND., GEORGIA’S TAX DOLLARS HELP
FINANCE PRIVATE SCHOOLS WITH SEVERE ANTI-GAY POLICIES, PRACTICES, & TEACHINGS 1–2
(2013),
http://www.southerneducation.org/getattachment/857328be-3d6b-415f-af8bda7bd3b75519/Georgia%E2%80%99s-Tax-Dollars-Help-Finance-Private-Schools.aspx.
North
Carolina schools accepting vouchers have also been documented as having explicit anti-gay biases.
Chris Fitzsimon, More Taxpayer Funding for Voucher Schools that Openly Discriminate Against
LGBT Students and Parents, NC POL’Y WATCH (July 27, 2016, 6:19 AM), https://www.ncpolicywatch.com/2016/07/27/more-taxpayer-funding-for-voucher-schools-that-openly-discriminateagainst-lgbt-students-and-parents/print/.
165. In Indiana’s “scholarship” (voucher) program, if more applicants apply “who meet the requirements for admission” than there are seats available, the school must make selections of those
applicants by lottery. IND. CODE ANN. § 20-51-4-3 (LexisNexis 2016).
166. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A).
167. Lisa Postal et al., Schools Without Rules, ORLANDO SENTINEL (Oct. 17, 2017),
http://www.orlandosentinel.com/features/education/os-florida-school-voucher-investigation-1018htmlstory.html.
168. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 1002.42(h) (West 2016) (emphasis added).
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participating in the Florida McKay voucher program are minimal, consisting
of an annual “written explanation of the student’s progress” and cooperation
with state assessment should the parent wish. 169 Oversight of private-school
voucher programs is similarly limited in other states as well.170 The voucher
program can also offer perverse incentives to public schools, which can encourage parents of students who are expensive to educate, and who may not
score well on standardized tests, to use the scholarship to attend a private
school. 171
IV. COMPETING INTERESTS
A. Right of Individual Choice vs. Obligation for Equal Protection
The Supreme Court has made clear that parents have the right to choose
to educate their children in private and religious settings rather than public
schools. In Pierce v. Society of Sisters, the Court stated:
The fundamental theory of liberty upon which all governments in
this Union repose excludes any general power of the State to standardize its children by forcing them to accept instruction from public teachers only. The child is not the mere creature of the state;
those who nurture him and direct his destiny have the right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare him for additional
obligations. 172
However, all states have an obligation under the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution to provide equal
opportunity to all students.173 This obligation is clearly articulated by the
original Brown v. Board of Education decision 174 and following desegregation orders; the Virginia state and federal decisions preventing Virginia from
shutting down some school districts if others in the state remained open; 175

169. Id. § 1002.39(8)(c)(1). One protection that students with disabilities do have is that “[a]
student with a disability may only be recommended for suspension or expulsion in accordance with
State Board of Education rules.” Id. § 1002.20(4)(a).
170. See, e.g., Rob O’Dell & Yvonne Wingett Sanchez, Oversight of Arizona ESA SchoolVoucher Program ‘Almost a Sham’, REPUBLIC (June 22, 2017), https://www.azcentral.com/story/news/local/arizona-education/2017/06/22/oversight-arizona-esa-school-voucherprogram-almost-sham/407961001/.
171. Gus Garcia-Roberts, McKay Scholarship Program Sparks a Cottage Industry of Fraud and
Chaos, MIAMI NEW TIMES (June 23, 2011), http://www.miaminewtimes.com/news/mckay-scholarship-program-sparks-a-cottage-industry-of-fraud-and-chaos-6381391.
172. Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925).
173. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
174. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954).
175. Griffin v. Cty. Sch. Bd., 377 U.S. 218 (1964); James v. Almond, 170 F. Supp. 331 (E.D.
Va. 1959); see also supra Section I.A.
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and in special education decisions Pennsylvania Association for Retarded
Children v. Pennsylvania 176 and Mills v. Board of Education. 177
When Americans talk about school choice today, it is usually described
using Friedman’s language of competition. 178 There is, however, another
motive driving many proponents of choice: religious separation. A desire for
separation drives religious conservatives like Betsy DeVos, the current Secretary of Education under President Donald Trump. 179 Significant Christian
leaders and organizations have called on parents to take their children out of
public schools, and home schooling and Christian education is increasing. 180
In Indiana, more parents cite a desire for a more religious environment as
their reason for using the voucher program to send their children to private
school than any other reason, including academic reasons. 181
At the same time, teachers and officials in Indiana express growing concern about the decreased funding for public schools due to vouchers. 182
There is a vast difference between allowing parents to enroll their children in
parochial schools, on the one hand, and using public funds to support parochial schooling to the detriment of the goal of equal protection, including an
appropriate education in the LRE for students with disabilities, on the other.
Recently, “[w]hen pollsters [for EdNext] asked survey participants whether
they supported ‘government funds’ being used for private school tuition—
versus giving families ‘wider choice’—vouchers received less support.” 183
In many ways, the divide over Milwaukee’s voucher program mirrors
the current conundrum about school vouchers. 184 On one hand, proponents,

176. 343 F. Supp. 279 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
177. 348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972).
178. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
179. Rizga, supra note 13 (describing Betsy DeVos’s history of philanthropic giving to Christian schools as evidence of her desire to expand Christian education and quoting her saying, “There
are not enough philanthropic dollars in America to fund what is currently the need in education . . . .
Our desire is to confront the culture in ways that will continue to advance God’s kingdom”).
180. KATHERINE STEWART, THE GOOD NEWS CLUB 245–56 (2012).
181. Meghan Mangrum, Religious Schooling Is the Top Reason Parents Use Vouchers, Survey
Finds, CHALKBEAT (June 28, 2016), https://www.chalkbeat.org/posts/in/2016/06/28/religiousschooling-is-the-top-reason-parents-use-vouchers/; see also Stephanie Mencimer, Mike Pence’s
Voucher Program in Indiana Was a Windfall for Religious Schools, MOTHER JONES (Dec. 2, 2016),
http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2016/12/mike-pence-voucher-program-religious-schools/.
182. Shaina Cavazos, Six Things to Know About Indiana’s School Voucher Program, A Model
Betsy DeVos Could Support, CHALKBEAT (Nov. 30, 2016), https://www.chalkbeat.org/posts/in/2016/11/30/six-things-to-know-about-indianas-school-voucher-program-a-possible-model-for-betsy-devos/.
183. Arianna Prothero, Public Support for Charter Schools Plummets, Poll Finds, EDUC. WK.
(Aug. 15, 2017), https://www.edweek.org/ew/articles/2017/08/15/public-support-for-charterschools-plummets-poll.html.
184. While black parents and community members led the push for choice in Milwaukee, black
parents and community members, most notably the National Association for the Advancement of
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such as Professor Howard Fuller, founder of the Black Alliance for Educational Options, argue, “[M]ost of Milwaukee’s African-American students
are trapped in failing schools. These kids’ parents, says Fuller, should have
the right to choose a better school for their children because very little else
that the African-American community has fought for has helped rescue poor
black children in need of good schools.” 185
Wendell Harris, on the other hand, was one of the original National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (“NAACP”) plaintiffs who
sued the state of Wisconsin in 1990 to try to stop the voucher program. 186
Today, as a member of the Milwaukee School Board, he notes that private
and parochial schools are not required to accept students with special needs
and are not required to disclose suspension and expulsion rates. Of that, he
says, “[P]rivate and public schools don’t play by the same rules. The issue
of public money with no oversight, I have a problem with that.” 187
School choice programs tend to lead to greater segregation in many respects. Mentioned above is religious separation, and this Article focuses on
the limiting of integration of students with disabilities, but it is important to
note that even when it is arguably not a deliberate goal, school choice tends
to lead to increased racial segregation. This can be seen quite starkly in Minnesota, for example. In 1972, the United States District Court for the District
of Minnesota ordered segregated Minneapolis to desegregate, 188 and by 1999,
there were nine segregated elementary schools in the Minneapolis-St. Paul
metro area. 189 In a dramatic reversal, as of 2008, there were forty-five. 190

Colored People (“NAACP”), also opposed the voucher program in Milwaukee. MCGROARTY, supra note 11, at 7–8.
185. Claudio Sanchez, Lessons on Race and Vouchers from Milwaukee, NPR (May 16, 2017),
https://www.npr.org/sections/ed/2017/05/16/523612949/lessons-on-race-and-vouchers-from-milwaukee.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. See Booker v. Special Sch. Dist. No. 1, 351 F. Supp. 799 (D. Minn. 1972).
189. Beth Hawkins & Cynthia Boyd, Twin Cities-Area Schools More Segregated Than Ever,
MINNPOST (Nov. 17, 2008), https://www.minnpost.com/politics-policy/2008/11/twin-cities-areaschools-more-segregated-ever [hereinafter Hawkins & Boyd, Twin Cities-Area Schools]. Beth
Hawkins and Cynthia Boyd explain:
Designed by researchers at the University of Minnesota’s Institute on Race and Poverty,
this definition of segregation includes schools where the share of blacks, Hispanics or
Asian students exceeds [fifty] percent, or schools with varying combinations of black,
Hispanic and Asian students, where the relative share of white students in the schools
does not exceed [thirty] percent. In predominantly white schools, the share of each nonwhite group is smaller than [ten] percent. Any school that is neither non-white segregated
nor predominantly white is considered integrated.
Beth Hawkins & Cynthia Boyd, The Definition of Segregation, MINNPOST (Nov. 17, 2008),
https://www.minnpost.com/infodoc/2008/11/definition-segregation.
190. Hawkins & Boyd, Twin Cities-Area Schools, supra note 189.
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The increase in segregated schools coincided neatly with the increase of charter schools, which serve primarily minority students in Minneapolis. 191 In
Minneapolis and St. Paul, charter schools are often designed to target a specific minority group, such as the Hmong International Academy and the Afrocentric Education Academy. 192 Charter schools have been explicitly promoted by the Federal Department of Education since 2009, 193 and segregated
charter schools are increasingly common throughout the country. 194 Parents
of all races prefer schools in which their children would not be a minority. 195
White parents, in particular, are reluctant to send their children to schools
with large numbers of black children and use race as a proxy for determining
quality. 196
B. Maximizing Individual Achievement of Some Children Does Not
Adequately Serve the Public Policy Goal of Educating All Children
An educated public is important for a functioning society and economy.
As jobs require increasingly greater levels of knowledge and skills, all countries have a need for their citizens to have some significant level of education
to continue economic growth. 197 All state constitutions require the state to
provide a baseline standard of education to all children, though that baseline
varies from state to state. 198
Even as Friedman advocated for parental choice in education in a society that values individual freedom as its “ultimate objective,” Friedman recognized that “[a] stable and democratic society is impossible without widespread acceptance of some common set of values and without a minimum
191. Katherine Kersten, Don’t Protest, Just Shop Somewhere Else, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 2, 2006),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB114125788411186941.
192. Beth Hawkins & Cynthia Boyd, The Rise of Voluntarily Segregated Schools: New Trend,
Familiar Problems, MINNPOST (Nov. 19, 2008), https://www.minnpost.com/politics-policy/2008/11/rise-voluntarily-segregated-schools-new-trend-familiar-problems.
193. See U.S. DEP’T. OF EDUC., RACE TO THE TOP PROGRAM EXECUTIVE SUMMARY (2009),
https://www2.ed.gov/programs/racetothetop/executive-summary.pdf.
194. FRANKENBERG ET AL., supra note 16, at 9–11 (“[C]harters exacerbate already rampant
American school segregation, particularly for black students.”); James, supra note 16, at 1114–17;
Minow, supra note 16, at 836–40.
195. Hastings et al., supra note 16, at 28 (“[T]he average preferred school for each racial group
was one in which [seventy percent] of the school was their own race.”).
196. DeJarnatt, supra note 16, at 18 (“[P]arents used the internet resource to reject schools having a significant majority of black students before they focused on other indicators of school quality. . . . [and] race is closely related to parental perceptions of school quality. . . . [A]n increase of
more than two percent in the African-American population of a student body correlated with a perception that the school’s quality had declined even when the objective criteria contradicted that
perception.” (footnotes omitted)).
197. See, e.g., LINDA DARLING-HAMMOND, THE FLAT WORLD AND EDUCATION: HOW
AMERICA’S COMMITMENT TO EQUITY WILL DETERMINE OUR FUTURE 2–8 (2010) (citing changes
in the nature of the workforce and other countries’ efforts to educate their citizenry).
198. Black, supra note 16, at 1402–08.
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degree of literacy and knowledge on the part of most citizens.” 199 So, while
Friedman idealized a system in which all parents would be able to select educational options freely in a free market, Friedman also acknowledged that
education is not merely a private good but a public necessity. 200 As laid out
in Part II, federal law codifies the importance of educating children with disabilities.
Children with special needs generally make greater educational gains in
inclusive settings than in classrooms segregated by ability. 201 These gains
are important for students with disabilities to prepare for independence and
employment. Overall, there is also a modest positive impact on general education students, both educationally and socially, when special education students are included in their general education classrooms. 202
Many individual students win in school choice. There are countless stories of individual lives bettered by charter schools and by access to private
schools through vouchers or scholarships. Advocates for charter schools regularly tell these stories, like that of Troy Simon, a New Orleans native who
credits a charter school with turning his life around and enabling him to move
from near illiteracy to becoming a student at Yale Divinity School. 203 These
stories abound, not just about low-income or minority students generally, but
also about students with disabilities, as can be seen in states like Florida,
which has a disability-specific voucher/scholarship program. 204
However, many individual students lose in school choice. Students who
have disabilities often lose, as laid out in Part III. Parents of students with
disabilities often have trouble locating appropriate schools for their children.
After enrolling their children in private schools that seem to offer appropriate
services, parents find out too late that their children are not receiving adequate services. At that point, there is less recourse to remedies than there
would be in public schools under the IDEA. 205 Even the adamantly pro-

199. Friedman, supra note 46, at 124–25.
200. Id. at 125.
201. Ruijs & Peetsma, supra note 92, at 69–71; see Geoff Lindsay, Educational Psychology and
the Effectiveness of Inclusive Education/Mainstreaming, 77 BRIT. J. EDUC. PSYCHOL. 1, 8–11
(2007) (reviewing several years of studies conducted in the United States and the United Kingdom).
202. Afroditi Kalambouka et al., The Impact of Placing Pupils with Special Educational Needs
in Mainstream Schools on the Achievement of Their Peers, 49 EDUC. RES. 365 (2007); Lindsay,
supra note 201, at 15; Ruijs & Peetsma, supra note 92, at 74–78.
203. OSBORNE, supra note 12, at 47–48.
204. Jeff Barlis, Scholarship, Kingdom Academy Spurred Turnaround for Miami Student, STEP
UP FOR STUDENTS (Nov. 14, 2017), https://blog.stepupforstudents.org/scholarship-kingdom-academy-spurred-turnaround-miami-student/.
205. See supra Section III.B.
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school-choice Manhattan Institute reported that a significant number of parents of recipients of Florida’s McKay Scholarship for students with disabilities had difficulty finding an “acceptable school” for their children. 206
Choice also tends to reward families with high levels of information,
social connections, and money—these families have greater access to the individual benefits choice can offer—while lower income families with less
information find themselves with fewer choices. In voucher systems without
significant income restrictions, wealthy parents can pay the difference between the value of a voucher and the cost of tuition, a difference that is sometimes substantial. 207 Distance, availability of transportation, and siblings’
schools all impact actual availability of choices.208 In choice systems, parents
tend to choose what is familiar over what is unfamiliar and rely on their social
networks to choose schools. 209 As a result, low-income children tend to
choose schools where large numbers of students are from low-income backgrounds. 210 Segregation by class is sometimes more dramatic than segregation by race in school systems that feature some version of parental choice. 211
As Professor Osamudia R. James points out:
[I]f we acknowledge, as we must, that the drivers of underachievement in schools are concentrated poverty and isolation of students
by race and class, then charters do little more then give parents
more say in socially, politically, and fiscally vulnerable schools, at
the expense of the democratic and anti-subordination values that
integrated schools impart. 212
Most parents across socio-economic and racial spectrums prefer neighborhood schools that provide positive educations for their children. But that
is not always available to less wealthy families, particularly in urban areas. 213
When choice leaves many students without adequate options, substituting
choice for acceptable local public schools actually leaves too many parents
without any true choices.
206. GREENE & FORSTER, supra note 18, at 11.
207. Annie Waldman, Voucher Program Helps Well-Off Vermonters Pay for Prep School at
Public Expense, PROPUBLICA (June 2, 2017), https://www.propublica.org/article/voucher-programhelps-well-off-vermonters-pay-prep-school-at-public-expense?utm_
campaign=sprout&utm_medium=social&utm_source=facebook&utm_content=1496408041.
208. James, supra note 16, at 1103 n.91.
209. DeJarnatt, supra note 16, at 18.
210. Id. at 18, 32–33; see also Stevens et al., supra note 142, at 125–45.
211. The introduction of magnet schools, an early version of school choice used by some cities
to reduce racial segregation, led quickly to greater class segregation even as racial segregation decreased. Carmel McCoubrey, Magnet Schools and Class, N.Y. TIMES (June 23, 1999),
http://www.nytimes.com/1999/06/23/us/notebook-magnet-schools-and-class.html?emc=eta1.
212. James, supra note 16, at 1117 (footnote omitted).
213. Anna Rhodes & Siri Warkentien, Unwrapping the Suburban “Package Deal”: Race,
Class, and School Access, 54 AM. EDUC. RES. J. 168S, 169S (2017).
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Even when choice programs begin by specifically targeting underserved
populations, they may expand to benefit primarily those who would already
be in private school. In Indiana, the state voucher program began by requiring that recipients attend at least a year in public school. Former Indiana
governor, now United States Vice President, Mike Pence pushed successfully
to change that policy, and now more than half of Indiana voucher recipients
have never attended public school.214 The Indiana voucher program’s income restrictions, which initially prioritized low-income students, were also
loosened, allowing middle class families to qualify. 215
Not only does school choice leave many students with unequal or inadequate educational options, it does not improve education as a whole. Data
on school choice make clear that student achievement, as measured by standardized test scores, does not reliably improve when parents have greater
choice in the schools their children attend. Data from Indiana and Louisiana,
two of the largest school-choice projects, show that “public school students
that received vouchers to attend private schools scored lower compared to
similar students who did not attend private schools.” 216 Stanford education
professor Martin Carnoy reviewed two decades of data on the impacts of
vouchers, and concluded that vouchers do not improve educational achievement for either students who receive them or students in school districts affected by voucher competition. 217 A longitudinal study of students in private
and public schools found that any advantage private school students had over
public school students was completely eliminated when the study’s authors
controlled for socioeconomic factors. 218 Data on charter schools is similarly
uninspiring, with more charter schools underperforming on test scores than
over performing as compared to the local district public schools. 219 The single measure by which choice schools consistently perform well is in parental
satisfaction. 220 Several decades in, it is clear that school choice is not a cure
214. Emma Brown & Mandy McLaren, How Indiana’s School Voucher Program Soared, and
What It Says About Education in the Trump Era, WASH. POST (Dec. 26, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/education/how-indianas-school-voucher-program-soared-and-what-it-saysabout-education-in-the-trump-era/2016/12/26/13d1d3ec-bc97-11e6-91ee1adddfe36cbe_story.html?tid=sm_tw&utm_term=.829d2cbabb06.
215. Waldman, supra note 207.
216. MARK DYNARSKI, ON NEGATIVE EFFECTS OF VOUCHERS 2 (2016), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/vouchers-and-test-scores.pdf.
217. CARNOY, supra note 18, at 1–3; Carrie Spector, Vouchers Do Not Improve Student
Achievement, Stanford Researcher Finds, STANFORD NEWS (Feb. 28, 2017), http://news.stanford.edu/2017/02/28/vouchers-not-improve-student-achievement-stanford-researcher-finds/.
218. Robert C. Pianta & Arya Ansari, Does Attendance in Private Schools Predict Student Outcomes at Age 15? Evidence from a Longitudinal Study, 47 EDUC. RES. 419, 429 (2018).
219. CTR. FOR RES. ON EDUC. OUTCOMES, supra note 18.
220. See, e.g., GREENE & FORSTER, supra note 18, at 1 (describing satisfaction of parents who
participate in the McKay Scholarship program as high, though only sixty-two percent of former
participants were happy with their choice school).
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for educational problems, and while many parents are happy with their access
to choice, many other parents are left without adequate choice in choice systems, perpetuating and even increasing inequality, particularly for students
with disabilities.
V. SCHOOL CHOICE LEGISLATION SHOULD BE EXPLICITLY CONSISTENT
WITH THE IDEA, THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE, AND CLEARLY
ARTICULATED PUBLIC POLICY GOALS FOR INTEGRATION AND NONDISCRIMINATION

A. The Role of Advocates
As The Wall Street Journal reported in 2011, “school choice is now here
to stay.” 221 For many years, advocates against vouchers argued that voucher
programs funding religious schools violated the Establishment Clause of the
First Amendment to the Constitution. That argument cannot now be used to
constrain voucher programs. 222 In Zelman v. Simmons-Harris 223 and then in
Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia v. Comer, 224 the Supreme Court made
clear that religious schools could participate in federally funded programs. 225
Private schools, including parochial schools, can accept public payment for
tuition through vouchers and through other payment schemes, and can directly accept government funds. 226
Advocates against charter schools have challenged the legitimacy of
funding charter schools under state laws and constitutions, but charter school
development continues. 227 In Washington, teachers’ unions and other groups
challenged state laws regarding charter schools, obtaining a state supreme
court verdict that charter schools did not qualify as “common schools” and
could not be funded using state general funds. 228 The state legislature
promptly rewrote the law to fund charter schools from lottery proceeds. 229
Across the country, a school district in New Jersey challenged state approval
221. Richard Komer, School Choice Is Here to Stay, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 29, 2011),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424053111904787404576532201473726910.
222. Black, supra note 16, at 1413.
223. 536 U.S. 639 (2002).
224. 137 S. Ct. 2012 (2017).
225. Comer, 137 S. Ct. at 2021–22; Zelman, 536 U.S. at 649–52.
226. Comer, 137 S. Ct. at 2022; Zelman, 536 U.S. at 652.
227. See Robert J. Martin, Charting the Court Challenges to Charter Schools, 109 PA. ST. L.
REV. 43, 102 (2004) (“It seems clear that the outcome of charter school cases decided in state and
federal courts have not served as a significant derailment to the growth of the charter school movement.”).
228. League of Women Voters v. State, 355 P.3d 1131, 1133–34 (Wash. 2015).
229. Melissa Santos, Teachers Union, Others to Sue State over New Charter School Law, NEWS
TRIB.
(Apr.
7,
2016),
http://www.thenewstribune.com/news/politics-government/article70646712.html.
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of a charter school expansion, arguing that it depleted the funding for the
school districts’ own students while educating large numbers of students
from neighboring school districts. 230 The Appellate Division of the Superior
Court of New Jersey denied the claim, holding that the court had only limited
authority to review state administrative decisions and that the approval was
within the bounds of state charter law. 231
Despite the courts’ reluctance to limit expansion of school choice programs, advocates can take action to hold states responsible for providing
equal access to education as those programs are considered or implemented.
The Supreme Court has made clear that, under the Equal Protection Clause,
all states must provide equal access to the baseline education they provide to
any group of students. 232 Equal access does not necessarily mean equal education. As a country, we have more or less accepted that inequality exists. 233
With respect to racial segregation, the Supreme Court has declined to recognize a role for the courts in limiting de facto segregation, instead limiting
desegregation and monitoring orders to districts with at least de jure segregation. 234 Under the IDEA, school districts are required only to develop programs designed for students to make “meaningful progress,” not necessarily
maximize each student’s progress.235 Still, despite limitations, the Constitution demands a baseline standard of equality, 236 as do state constitutions, 237
and the IDEA provides a floor for adequate education and mainstreaming. 238
Consistently articulated public policy interests demand this as well. 239
Students with disabilities are uniquely situated in that they have a clear
statutory right in every state to a certain level of education and to education
in a type of setting: the least restrictive setting. 240 School-choice programs
230. Highland Park Bd. of Educ. v. Hespe, No. A-3890-14T1, 2018 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS
158 at *4–7 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Jan. 24, 2018).
231. Id. at *10–19.
232. See supra Section II.A.
233. See, e.g., MICHAEL J. SANDEL, WHAT MONEY CAN’T BUY: THE MORAL LIMITS OF
MARKETS 8, 202–03 (2012) (noting, regarding students who have access to elite schools rather than
failing ones, that “[w]here all good things are bought and sold, having money makes all the difference in the world”).
234. See, e.g., Jonathan Fischbach et al., Race at the Pivot Point: The Future of Race-Based
Policies to Remedy De Jure Segregation After Parents Involved in Community Schools, 43 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 491, 494 (2008) (examining overlaps between de jure and de facto segregation
and potential future directions in court rulings on racial segregation and integration in schools).
235. Endrew F. v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist., 137 S. Ct. 988, 996, 998 (2017).
236. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954); see also
supra Section II.B. Derek Black argues that the Fourteenth Amendment actually “embedded education as an implicit right.” Derek W. Black, The Constitutional Compromise to Guarantee Education, 70 STAN. L. REV. 735, 768 (2018).
237. See, e.g., Black, supra note 16, at 1403.
238. See supra Section II.B.
239. See supra Section II.A.
240. See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
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cannot operate in a way that impedes equal access to education for students
with disabilities. Disrupting the rights specified in the IDEA for some students by not offering adequate placement options that are subject to and adhere with the standards of the IDEA significantly impedes the right to equal
access.
Students who do not have identified disabilities can also be harmed
when school choice envelops a school district. 241 The problems of students
with disabilities, who have identifiable rights and accessible remedies though
the IDEA, are, in some ways, the canaries in the coal mine warning of the
dangers of choosing school choice policies over local public education.
While students with disabilities have statutory protections, and the Constitution does not provide an explicit right to education, states that offer public
education must provide equal access to the baseline education they provide
to any group of students, as noted above. To the greatest extent possible,
advocates should also look to protections offered by state constitutions to
protect all students. 242
B. Legislative Suggestions
Although schools receiving federal funds are obligated to follow laws
regarding discrimination, affirmative policies to promote equal access are
also necessary. Restrictions on federal funds should be designed to remove
incentives for school-choice programs to disadvantage students with disabilities and privilege middle and upper-middle class families who would send
their general-education children to private or religious schools regardless of
vouchers. Advocates should push for legislation and regulations that proactively protect vulnerable populations by putting affirmative obligations on all
schools that accept public funds. Changes should be made at the federal and
state levels to ensure that all schools receiving government funding—including charter, private and parochial schools—must comply with the IDEA and
its legislative embodiment of the principals of the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment.
There is currently no federal requirement for states to promulgate regulations holding private schools accountable for providing procedural protections to students with disabilities. 243 One option is for the federal government
to change the standards under the IDEA to encompass private schools educating students with disabilities using federal funds. States could also do the
same without federal action. Nothing in federal law prohibits states from
241. See supra Part IV.
242. See Black, supra note 16, at 1359 (“[W]hile states may establish choice programs, they
cannot systematically advantage choice programs over public education[, and] . . . choice programs[’] . . . practical effect cannot impede educational opportunities in public schools.”).
243. St. Johnsbury Acad. v. D.H., 240 F.3d 163, 170 (2d Cir. 2001).
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requiring all schools to meet the requirements of the IDEA should they accept
students with state funding related to the IDEA. Some states, such as New
Jersey, have already done so. 244
Another change to consider would be to require schools receiving federal funds under the IDEA, voucher, or other funding schemes to address
their LEA status. Right now, the onus of responsibility generally falls on the
public-school district where a student lives or where the choice school is located. 245 In those states that allow charter schools to be their own LEA, the
charter schools almost always lack sufficient resources to appropriately serve
all comers, as discussed in Section III.A. Instead, Congress should promote
coordinated pooling of resources and responsibility within communities and
within charter schools or private-school systems (such as KIPP and Catholic
dioceses).
Moreover, legislative changes should take into account the perverse incentives of increased standardized testing noted in Section III.A. School
evaluations should become more holistic and less narrowly focused on standardized testing. Jack Schneider, an Assistant Professor of Education at College of the Holy Cross and Director of Research for the Massachusetts Consortium for Innovative Education Assessment, developed a model in
Massachusetts that could serve as a foundation for those who wish to hold
schools accountable but understand that standardized testing fails to do so. 246
VI. CONCLUSION
School choice can be beneficial to many individual children. Most people placing their children in choice schools, running choice schools, or teaching within them, are acting in reasonable, rational, and sympathetic ways.
244. P.N. v. Greco, 282 F. Supp. 2d 221, 237–38 (D. N.J. 2003) (“The fact that, even in the case
of private school placement, ‘responsibility for compliance with IDEA remains with the public
agency,’ does not imply that the no responsibility falls upon the private school: it is not by any
means illogical for both the public authority (which has the initial and ultimate obligation to educate
the child) and the private school (which is actually entrusted with the task and given the requisite
funds) to be subject to IDEA rules.” (citations omitted) (quoting St. Johnsbury Acad., 240 F.3d at
171)). Minnesota has a slightly different provision, requiring public schools to provide a FAPE to
students in private schools. A federal court recently ruled based on state law that the Minneapolis
public school district was required to provide services that would provide a FAPE to a student enrolled in a private school. Special Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. R.M.M., 861 F.3d 769, 770, 778 (8th Cir.
2017). Neither state vouchers nor any form of federal funding were at issue in this case or in the
state law, and the burden fell entirely to the school district under state law, a solution that is not
necessarily ideal, but it provides an example of a state looking to consider FAPE rights in the private
school context.
245. See supra Section II.C.
246. See JACK SCHNEIDER, BEYOND TEST SCORES: A BETTER WAY TO MEASURE SCHOOL
QUALITY 12 (2017); see also RAVITCH, supra note 14, at 261–73 (describing problems with relying
on standardized test scores to measure student achievement and school quality and making suggestions for improvement).

510

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 78:470

That being said, school choice has not proven to be a panacea for troubles
facing public school systems in this country. Moreover, implementing system-wide choice programs leads to troubling questions of access and, indeed,
limited choices. We cannot ignore that increasing school choice makes students with disabilities more vulnerable. As a country, we have reached a
consensus that students with disabilities are entitled to an appropriate education in public schools with general-education students to the greatest extent
possible. Detailed regulations, however imperfect, have been instrumental
in making that goal realistic for students with disabilities. Unchecked school
choice threatens to undermine the ability of children with disabilities to receive that appropriate education. Since, as a country, we have decided to go
down the path of choice, we must amend our legislation to actively protect
the most vulnerable students. Even without amended legislation, attorneys
should litigate to protect the rights of students with disabilities in federal and
state courts based on the principle of equal protection under the law.

